The Rise of Qardh

I wrote earlier in July 2014 about re-branding Wadiah following discussions the industry had with BNM. In that meeting, the key take-away was that there is an intention to re-brand Wadiah into Qard, to which the industry reacted negatively as Wadiah has always been used for short-term deposit structures where discretionary hibah “gifts” are given to depositors. BNM contention was that Wadiah do not meet the practice of the Bank where Wadiah was supposed to be taken as “safe-keeping based on trusteeship” (Wadiah Yad Amanah) or “safe-keeping with guarantee” (Wadiah Yad Dhamanah). The main argument was the under the Wadiah structure, the ownership of the fungible asset remains with the customer and the Bank has not obtained sufficient consent from the customer to utilise their funds, specifically for Wadiah Yad Dhamanah.

Wadiah 2014

The solution for the above conundrum, offered by BNM, is therefore, migrate to Qard-based products, where by virtue of it being a loan from the customer to the Bank, the ownership is transferred to the Bank allowing the Bank to utilise it as it pleases, while guaranteeing the loan amount upon demand (you have to repay back the loan).

As mentioned in my earlier writing, some industry players has clear reservation to convert Wadiah to Qard, seeing that the various guidelines are coming thick and fast to comply with requirements under Investment Accounts. Handling another major change in regulations will just hamper the industry’s growth.

Now, 16 January 2015. The revised Concept Paper for Wadiah was issued. We are given 1 month to respond with our feedback.

Wadiah CP

The biggest shock is that the paper has re-defined Wadiah as only Wadiah Yad Amanah i.e. safe-keeping trusteeship. There was NO mention of the contract that most Banks are currently using for Current Account / Savings Account i.e. Wadiah Yad Dhamanah (safe-keeping with guarantee) which allowed the Banks to utilise the funds for Bank’s activities. What this removal of definition means:

  1. The Bank takes Customer Assets and safely keeps as Wadiah in the Bank until a request to withdraw the Asset is made by the customer. The Bank must return the initial Asset to the customer upon request, with no obligation to provide any other benefits.
  2. The Bank does not have the right to utilise this Asset under Wadiah anymore #.
  3. If the Bank intents to utilise the money for purpose of generating returns, then the rules of Qard must apply i.e. for the Bank to obtain the right to utilise the money, the ownership of the money must be transferred to the Bank i.e. the customer no longer has financial and ownership rights when the funds are utilised by the Bank to generate returns. It is a loan by the customer to the Bank. As owner of the money now, the Bank has full rights to the returns. The Bank has no obligations to the customer except of return of the loan on demand. Discretionary hibah “gift” may be given, but questions may soon come on its validity when it is deemed as “Urf” (customary, no longer discretionary).

# Previously under the rules of Wadiah Yad Dhamanah, if the Bank intends to utilise fungible Assets deposited by customers to Banks such as money, sufficient consent must be obtained before the Bank utilise the money for other purpose (including for generating returns). In reality, this consent is really lacking especially for a daily product such as Current Account or Savings Account, resulting in insufficient rights to use customer’s fund to generate returns. The Banks are also not allowed to agree the returns up-front for the use of the money yet circumvents this by publishing historical rates of returns instead. This “historical return” soon was construed as non-discretionary and deemed as returns that is treated as Urf’. Therefore, Wadiah Yad Dhamanah was totally removed by BNM as a viable Islamic Banking concept, and now to be replaced by Qard (where ownership of funds are wholly transferred to the Bank).

Utilisation of Money

In any circumstances, Banks do utilise the Customers’ money for banking activities, including investments. If we retain Wadiah under this new BNM definition, then it will greatly impair Islamic Banks if we are not able to utilise collected funds for generating profit. The Wadiah moving forward will only apply for Safe Deposit Box services where the Bank can charge a minimal fee for safe-keeping services. Trying to apply it to anything else will be a challenge.

Wadiah 2015

The Qard guidelines needs to come sooner than later. At least the Exposure Draft or the Concept Paper needs to be available for discussion and for Banks to assess the Impact going forward. The impact by IFSA 2013 will be fully felt right after the coming months of June 2015, and this new regulation will further add to the re-branding of Islamic Banking currently taking place in Malaysia.

New Reference Rate Framework (Concept Paper)

To read the New Reference Rate Framework Concept Paper, click here

One of the papers currently being floated around for discussion is the new Reference Rate paper. While no date is indicated for the paper to be effective, [Update : today it was announced that effective date by 2 January 2015] its implication will be significant to both the banking system in Malaysia, Islamic and non-Islamic. The main purpose of the paper is the way Banks price their financing product must now be different. Gone will be the Base Lending Rates (BLR) and Base Financing Rates (BFR), and welcome the new defined term; Prime Financing Rate (PFR).

The intention is this; a lot of the things that go into the BLR/BFR are pricing related to risks, and these premiums are loaded into the base borne by customers. This leaves the margin (or customer spread) that is charged becomes somewhat “clean” as a return to the bank, with the exception of impairments (loan/financing defaults). In addition, banks earn “additional” returns from the “savings” built into the BLR/BFR itself. As a lot of risk premiums are built into the base rate, if these risks do not materialise, the bank technically “earns” this savings. You charge the customer in the base rate some premium for the expected risks, but you get the benefit for it. Ideal scenario.

It is therefore no surprise that some good banks, that are able to manage their risks effectively, are pricing their financing at a base-minus rate. It is now common to see home financing packages being priced at BFR minus 2.0% p.a., and the BFR being 6.60% p.a., the pricing is therefore 4.40% p.a. In theory, taking into account the actual cost of funds, adding only the “necessary” premium to cater for risks that is beyond the bank’s control, the base-minus rate still makes decent money for the Banks.

Therefore, even at 4.40% p.a., there is still room for the Bank to earn a margin, after deducting actual cost of funds. I believe the new Reference Rate framework aims to address this issue somewhat.

The concept paper was issued in January 2014 and this will change the way we price the financing portfolio. Under the concept paper, the base pricing shall only consist of the following:

  1. Cost of Funds (COF) – this is essentially the equivalent to interbank borrowing rate or cost of capital
  2. Statutory Reserve Requirement (SRR) – this is a regulatory reserve requirement for financial prudence

As you can see, these components of the new Prime Financing Rate (PFR) leaves very little room for Banks to manoeuvre the rates. COF is market driven, based on interbank lending rates, while SRR is a regulatory requirement based on specific percentage. BNM know that these are the most rigid components to pricing, therefore this may be a deliberate composition selection by BNM aimed at institutions to re-think the pricing formula.

And under the new regime of PFR, the following should no longer be built into the base rate. These costs, if the Banks want it, should be a part of the margin to the Banks loaded into the customers.

  1. Operating Costs
  2. Administrative Costs
  3. Credit Risk Premium
  4. Liquidity Risk Premium
  5. Any profit margin

Prime Financing Rate

These cost, if to be taken by the Bank, must therefore be part of the margin charged onto the customer. Customer will now know what components go into their financing i.e. The margin is now reflective of the risk the Bank perceive onto the customer. The higher the customer’s risk profile, the higher the margin can be.

As such, the 2.50% p.a. maximum margin chargeable onto the base rate should no longer be applicable. As at January 2014, the BLR / BFR is 6.60% and at a margin of +2.50%, the maximum rate chargeable is 9.10% p.a. Under the new regime, the dynamics may now be different for example the PFR could be 3.90% and the margin +5.00% which adds up to 8.90%. In absolute terms it’s cheaper but the customer might balk at the +5.00% margin when they are used to +1.00% or even -1.00% margins.

This is actually a good framework as Banks will have to be more competitive in pricing as the lower the margin, the more risks you are taking on your customers as the risk pricing is built into the margin. Additionally, the concept paper restricts the bank from quoting a price lower than the PFR, and this will make sense because it won’t eat into the Bank’s Cost of Funds. While you can have a BFR-2.00% (i.e. 4.60%), a PFR-2.00% won’t make sense as the PFR component, for example priced at 3.90% will give a net financing rate of 1.90%, and eats into the cost of funds.

In short, the pricing for financing moving forward will be based on the creditworthiness of the customer. Any changes in pricing will be reflecting the changes in operating costs, portfolio defaults or funding strategies. It gives the Bank more flexibility to determine pricing based on agreed scenarios or specific events.

This is a positive development. Banks now have the ability to decide on how to price a product based on real strategies and existing capabilities. Customers will have more transparencies in terms of what they are being charged. This will also spur competition among Banks, and provide better products and services to consumers, especially if the Bank gets its risk profiling right and able to effectively manage its default. All this will require a critical re-think on how a product profitability is determined, and a re-think of how the right management can provide a sustainable financing portfolio.

Note: On the Deposit Rates requirements, there are not much in the Concept Paper itself. Most of the requirements on Deposits are captured under the various EDs such as Wadiah, Hibah, Wakalah and the Investment Account Concept Paper. The only notable mention on the Deposit Rates section is that for Basic Savings Account, returns should be paid irrespective of the account balance and shall not be lower than 0.25% per annum. Also, there is a clause that mentions for Islamic Current Accounts, any hibah/dividend payments should not exceed 2.00% per annum. This, in my opinion, runs counter to the ED on Wadiah (which allows the Bank pure discretionary payment of Hibah, and therefore should not be governed by a capped rate) and the Investment Account Concept Paper (which states that the Bank must reward the customer dividends due to them, based on actual portfolio performances, therefore should not be limited to only 2.00% per annum). These point are against the spirit of Wadiah and Mudharabah, as well as against the Competition Act. We understand BNM is discussing this point internally after receiving industry feedback, and may consider removing this from the framework. We wait with bated breath for this framework to be properly issued.

UPDATE : The 2.0% per annum maximum cap on the Islamic Current Account has been removed via BNM circular dated 20 March 2014. Indeed this puts us back on the right playing field with conventional banking.

For some news on the above topic, please find the following newspaper articles:

 

Readings : December Papers x 3

Murabaha

And to close off the year, BNM gave us a further 3 reading gifts for us to enjoy our holidays:

  1. Murabahah (2013)
  2. CP Mudarabah (SR,OP, OR)
  3. CP Musharakah (SR,OP,OR)

The Murabahah Standards looks interesting, and so is the Mudarabah Concept Paper. Do have a read and tell us what you think.

Looking forward to the coming holidays.

Exposure Draft : Wadiah

Image

One of the panic buttons we are pressing now is the new Wadiah Exposure Draft (ED). As a rule, Wadiah is a “safe-keeping with guarantee” arrangement, where a Bank agrees to take on-board customers deposits as a loan (Qardh). And in the rules of loan under Islamic Banking, a loan must be returned on the same amount when required; any amount above and beyond the loan amount, if put as a condition at the start or during of the deposit placement, may be construed as “Riba”. If the Bank utilises the deposits for any business activities, the Bank is given the discretion to award “Hibah” or gift payments allocated based on the balance outstanding.

With the introduction of the IFSA and the requirements that Malaysian Banks comply with the Investment Account Framework  if Mudarabah continued to be offered to Customers, the common wisdom is to migrate lock-stock-and-barrel into a Wadiah account. In my earlier writings, I already mentioned that to comply with the Investment Account Framework, a massive shift in thinking, processes, and management is required. Therefore to convert into a Wadiah structure may not be the ideal solution, but it will provide an “easier” route towards retaining Customers’ deposit.

Wadiah ED

However, in this chess game between the Islamic Banks and Bank Negara Malaysia (BNM), the new ED is introduced on Wadiah has effectively further tied the hands of the industry players. BNM had anticipated the industry intentions to move the Mudarabah structure into Wadiah, and promptly outlined further restrictions on Wadiah itself. The industry is now caught between a cold and hard place; stay with Mudarabah and comply with Investment Account Framework, or migrate into Wadiah and comply with the new Wadiah Guidelines.

Wadiah Concept Paper

As we know, Wadiah also puts significant limitation on the marketing of returns and benefits to customers for their deposits. BNM took this a step further; to emphasize that returns on a Wadiah account should always be discretionary, as Wadiah is now seen as a loan. The impact comes in several clauses in the Exposure Draft:

  1. Wadiah Yad Dhammanh is considered similar in nature to Qard. Therefore the rules of Qardh should also apply to Wadiah.
  2. A majority of customers should not be getting a return on the deposit under Qardh. Generally this is saying that out of 100 customers, only 49% of customer will be given a “gift” on their deposits
  3. The payment of the discretionary “gift” should not be construed as regular or common business practice (Urf’ Tijari) else it will imply that the “gift” is a constant return to the customer. Historical performance can be shown to customers.
  4. Any benefits, monetary or otherwise, deriving directly from the placement in the Wadiah account may be construed as “Riba” as well.
  5. Any benefits includes scenarios where should the Wadiah account be opened as part of a financing facility, and benefits enjoyed in the financing facility from amounts available in the Wadiah account (for example a rebate structure to off-set an obligation), shall be construed as riba’ as well.

My main question is; now that Mudharabah is turned into a pure investment account, and Wadiah carrying so many restrictions, what other solutions are there? It cannot be that BNM only expects us to comply but do not help with a viable solution on these restrictions. Yes we are looking at the Commodity Murabahah structures, but operationally this will be a challenge for the Banks to control the cost of commodity trade.

Wadiah ED

And how do we define majority, then? The system must now be enhanced to determine who gets the discretionary “gifts” based on which formula. Even if they qualify for the discretionary “gifts”, to award them on a regular basis will also lead to it be construed as “Urf Tijari”, where consistent payment of Hibah will imply a similar future returns. How do we define this “non-majority” of Customers whom qualifies for Hibah but do not get regular awards of Hibah? What system logic can we build and will what we build be acceptable to Sharia? More importantly, would the customer even accept such “discretionary” practice?

Now that BNM has issued a new Concept Paper on Shariah Requirements, Optional Practices and Operational Requirements of Mudarabah today, we get a somewhat watered-down requirements to Mudarabah products. I have read it and saw that under this new Framework, the Mudarabah structure remains viable as it is, with enhancements needed for documentation and disclosures. Manageable and workable. The next steps must be; if we were to stick with Mudarabah, which Framework will take precedent. Mudarabah is an Investment structure. So, would we follow the Mudarabah Framework, or to comply with the Investment Account Framework? Both Frameworks makes reference to each other; yet one is stricter than the other.

I am putting all my hopes on the new Framework. That will give me some leeway of having both Wadiah structure and a viable Mudarabah structure (not based on the Investment Account Framework). This is definitely the light at the end of the tunnel. But as usual, indications are to take the “stricter” guidelines into account, rather than keeping hope for an easier implementation.