Category Archives: Bank Negara Malaysia

Bai Al Inah and Interconditionality Issues

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I have been asked recently on the validity on a Bai Al Inah contract that had sparked controversies many years ago by claims that it is not a valid Islamic contract that is rejected by most Shariah scholars.

What do I think? As limited my Shariah knowledge is, the position of Bai Al Inah, and its counterpart Bai Bithaman Ajil (BBA), have always been that it is a structure of 2 standalone contracts of Musawamah (simple sale) and Murabahah (deferred cost-plus sale). The intention of these 2 contracts is for the purpose of obtaining cash or working capital through creation of debt. Both contracts are executed consequentially and valid as all the tenets of the contracts are met perfectly.

SO WHAT IS THE ISSUE THEN?
Generally both contracts of BBA and Bai Al Inah suffers from the same issue ie the existence of “Interconditionality” practices in their legal clauses in transaction documents. Both contracts have 2 standalone contracts i.e. one sale contract and one buy-back contract. Both contracts must be able to stand alone and the aqad is executed sequentially, which makes it valid based on trading rules.

The Aqad for the Bai Al Inah transaction uses the Bank’s own Assets for the underlying transaction, as the customer do not have any Asset to sell to the Bank in the first place. So Banks have been using their own Assets such as pieces of land, office hardware, office furnitures, company shares, investments in securities, machines, and any other valuable Assets that is identifiable, transferable and valuable.

CONTRACT #1 – SALE OF BANK’S ASSET (MURABAHAH) TO CUSTOMER IN BAL AL INAH 

These Assets are to be sold by the Bank to the Customer at a Sale Price (includes profit) and to be settled at a later date or at specific intervals. For example, the Bank sold its ATM equipment to the Customer at a price of RM180,000. This amount is to be paid back within 5 years (Deferred). This is a valid and perfected standalone contract. The debt created here remains valid until full settlement at the end of the 5th year.

CONTRACT #2 – BUY-BACK OF BANK’S ASSET (MUSAWAMAH) FROM CUSTOMER IN BAL AL INAH 

The Bank then makes an offer to Buy-Back the Bank’s Asset from the Customer at a simple sale transaction where the amount will be settled immediately. As the Customer intention is to obtain Cash or Working Capital, the Customer will generally agree to the Bank’s offer to Buy-Back the Asset at the current market price. For example, the Bank offers to buy-back the ATM equipment from the Customer at a price of RM100,000. This amount is to be paid immediately for settlement. Bank takes ownership of the ATM and pays the Customer RM100,000 cash. This is also a valid and perfected standalone contract

BUT WHAT HAPPENS IF THE CUSTOMER, AFTER COMPLETING CONTRACT #1, REFUSE TO ENTER INTO CONTRACT #2 AND DECIDE TO KEEP/TAKE THE DELIVERY OF THE ATM EQUIPMENT INSTEAD? THIS REPRESENTS A RISK TO THE BANK AS THE ASSET (ATM EQUIPMENT) IS NOW RIGHTFULLY OWNED BY THE CUSTOMER UPON COMPLETION OF CONTRACT #1

Because banks want to minimise risks, the interconditionality clauses are added to ENSURE that once the first sale contract (#1) is concluded, the second buy-back contract (#2) MUST be executed (mandatory). It goes on to say that if the second buy-back contract is not executed, then the first sale contract is invalid and restitution (going back to the original state) must be effected to recover the Asset already sold; in this case the ATM Equipment.

From Shariah point of view, it is problematic, because the first Aqad for the sale contract (#1), is a valid contract and completed under Aqad which meets all its trading tenets. To impose that another external event (i.e. the non-completion of the buy-back contract) that will invalidate a valid sale contract (already concluded and perfected), implies that the whole arrangement is superficial and do not carry real value.

This must not be the case, because the Aqad is already validly executed and is now running. Thus having the interconditional clauses is not favoured by Shariah and needs to be removed.

In Summary:
1) The Sale of Asset contract is valid on completion of Aqad
2) The Buy-Back of Asset contract is valid on completion of Aqad
3) If the Buy-Back of Asset contract (#2) is not completed, the Sale of Asset (#1) remains valid as the Aqad is already completed.
4) The requirement to force the Buy-Back of Asset contract to be completed via an interconditionality clause is problematic in substance. The notion of “one contract is only valid upon completion of another contract” does not sit well with Shariah.

Of course, for Banks, removal of such clauses from the documents represents a risk as the assets used for the transaction belongs to the Bank in the first place. The idea that the Customer cannot be compelled / forced to re-sell the assets back to the bank (or banks not allowed to buy-back) is a risk banks are not willing to take. As such impasse, the only way most banks can comply with the requirements to remove interconditionality in their contracts is to remove these contracts from their shelves.

There are still some Banks using products based on BBA or Bai Al Inah, but such usage is now limited to its uses are required by design (such as restructuring an existing Bai Al Inah account) and/or mainly transactions between financial institutions (not between banks and retail consumers) where the interconditionality clauses are not required/ can be ignored.

For the public, Tawarruq or Musyarakah Mutanaqisah or Ujrah structures are now used as acceptable replacements of both Bai Al Inah and BBA products, signalling the demise of these hugely unpopular products.

Wallahualam.

 

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The New Shariah Governance Policy Document (2019)

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SHARIAH GOVERNANCE POLICY DOCUMENT (2019)

One of the most anticipated documents by the industry is the renewed Shariah Governance Framework, which was last issued in 2011. Many were waiting with bated breath on what changes were made to the document. I had a quick look at it also and generally, there were a few fine-tuning done to existing regulations.

A quick summary of the points in the Shariah Governance Policy Document (2019) are as follows:

  1. The responsibilities of the Board of Directors are to approve the policies regarding Shariah governance, oversee the implementation of SAC’s ruling and internal control framework, oversee the performance of senior management and promote a culture of Shariah compliance in the bank.
  2. The Board of Directors also must interact sufficiently with the Shariah Committee including giving due regards to the Shariah Committee decisions, paying attention to facts and rational and the implication of implementing the decision, with proper conflict resolutions and record of all deliberations on the issues.
  3. The Board of Directors must also assess the performance of the Shariah Committee formally, at least annually and ensure the remunerations reflect members’ accountabilities.
  4. The key responsibilities of the Shariah Committee themselves are defined as follows:
    1. Provide a decision or advice on the application of SAC ruling and BNM standards on Shariah matters
    2. Provide a decision or advice on matters that requires a reference to be made by the SAC
    3. Provide a decision or advice on matters that may trigger Shariah Non-Compliant event
    4. Deliberate and affirm Shariah non-compliant findings
    5. Endorsing rectification measures for Shariah non-compliance event
  5. The Shariah Committee shall be accountable for the quality, accuracy and soundness in their decisions and advices.
  6.  The Shariah Committee must establish a robust methodology to guide decision making process including taking into account relevant business and risk practices.
  7. If Shariah decides to place additional restrictions on the business in applying SAC ruling (meaning : stricter than SAC rulings), the bank must document the deliberation, obtain Board of Directors view on the decision, and immediately notify BNM on the decision.
  8. The Shariah Committee must exercise objectivity in making a judgement or deriving a decision to avoid impairing professional objectivity. Sufficient time is to be devoted to prepare for and attend Shariah Committee meetings.
  9. The Shariah Committee must continuously develop reasonable understanding of the business and keep abreast of the latest market and regulatory development, to be led by the Chairman of the Shariah Committee.
  10. The Chairman of the Shariah Committee must be able to apply relevant procedures for Shariah deliberations, liaise with Board of Directors, ensure sound decisions are made, encourage healthy discussion on issues, and ensure maintenance of records supporting Shariah decisions.
  11. Shariah Committee meetings must be conducted at least once every 2 months  (at least 2 times a year for Islamic Banking Windows operations) and attendance of each member must be 75%. This information to be reported in the bank’s annual report.
  12. Appointment of the Shariah Committee must fulfil the following:
    1. the person is a Muslim
    2. the person is “fit and proper“
    3. the person is either Shariah qualified person or an expert possessing skills, knowledge and experience (to support the Shariah function)
  13. Shariah Qualified Person means the person:
    1. hold a minimum bachelor degree in Shariah which includes studies on Usul Fiqh (principles of Islamic Jurispruedence) or Fiqh Muamalat (Islamic transaction/commercial law)
    2. possesses solid knowledge in Shariah with reasonable Islamic finance knowledge and experience
    3. demonstrates strong proficiency and knowledge in written and verbal Arabic.
  14. A Shariah Committee member shall not serve in the same Bank for more than 9 years, must not accept appointment on more than 1 licensed banks, 1 licensed takaful operator and one prescribed institution. The member must also not be an active politician.
  15. The Shariah Committee composition must consist of a Shariah qualified Chairman of Shariah Committee and the majority of the Shariah Committee Members are Shariah qualified.
  16. The Shariah Secretariat must provide the Shariah Committee adequate time to deliberate all Shariah matters.

HOW MUCH POWER DOES THE SHARIAH COMMITTEE REALLY HAVE?

As expected, the Shariah Committee must have full accountability in making decisions via robust deliberation of issues, including considerations of business practices. This idea is consistent with BNM’s expectation that Shariah Committee must reach a certain level of competency in advising the banks. BNM, it seems, is prepared to provide authority for Shariah Committee to decide on the business direction, in line with the overarching SAC decisions. This indicates that the Shariah Committee is meant to be influential in the Islamic Banking industry.

However, BNM also allows the challenge on Shariah Committee decisions if the bank deems the decisions have not taken into considerations the practical and business sense, especially for decisions stricter than the SAC. In such circumstances, the Board of Directors provide a view on the decision, and must be escalated to BNM. To ensure that this scenario does not happen as often, both Shariah Committee and the business must align the understanding on the business direction and mitigate the discrepancies in understanding. The role of the Chairman of the Shariah Committee is important to manage the interactions between the Board of Directors and his Shariah Committee members.

The above underlines the seriousness of the Shariah Committee function. With great powers comes great responsibilities. To hold such authority, the Shariah Committee must reflect quality, accuracy and soundness in all their decision-making.

WILL A SHARIAH COMMITTEE FUNCTION REMAIN A PART-TIME JOB?

Books

Personally, I understand there are challenges for Shariah Committees to devote a sizeable amount of time to provide banks with high quality, fully deliberated decisions that is valuable to all stakeholders. There are still a number of Shariah Committees only choosing to stay in their areas of expertise while concentrating on their day jobs. We hardly see a scholar having a full-fledge research house coming into the market with resources that can support the business requirements of an Islamic Financial Institution (IFI).

Nothing is mentioned on the expected level of research to be done by a Shariah scholar. That level is still left to interpretation although with the requirement to be “conversant in Arabic” implies Shariah scholar should be referring their research and decisions more consistent with global standards, where text, references and decisions are discussed and derived in Arabic.

IS AVOIDING CONFLICT OF INTEREST MORE IMPORTANT THAN KNOWLEDGE SHARING?

One wish that I had for the Shariah Governance is the composition of Shariah Committee itself. While the limitation of service of not more than 9 years is good for an IFI (to encourage rotation in the industry), I still feel the knowledge growth and development of Shariah Committees may not be as fast as the anticipated industry growth. What more, I feel that the limitation of a Shariah scholar to only serve in 1 (one) Islamic Bank, 1 (one) Takaful Company, and 1 (one) Islamic Development Bank do not allow the sharing of knowledge between entities and industries. Perhaps there is a concern where there could be a conflict of interest? I do not know. All I know is that globally, it is common to see one advisor sitting on multiple boards; and from the knowledge gathering for being in multiple boards, can be a substantial resource for the IFI.

WHY NOT THE CURRENT STRUCTURE?

In my opinion, there is a real shortage of knowledge between the old guards and the new challengers in the areas of Islamic Banking. What I see nowadays are issues being re-discussed again and again, and some have been discussed at length in different forums or decades earlier, with solid resolutions. The new scholars do not have the full understanding of history, background and context on many issues (some of which have already been discussed), and the older guard of very prominent scholars are not able to share the history, perspective, experience, background and earlier discussions on matters of Islamic Banking. This gap remains huge as the young scholars run to catch up in terms of the understanding that the older guards have. This resulted in many real, new and current issues being somewhat ignored as past issues are again discussed.

SO WHAT IS MY DREAM TEAM FOR A SHARIAH COMMITTEE?

In my perfect world, I would love to see a combination of the following:

  1. The Shariah Committee Chairman. Senior person in the industry leading the committee, with vast experience of Islamic Banking operations, as well as Shariah Qualified and conversant in written and spoken Arabic. Must have leadership qualities to be able to manage the Shariah Committee.
  2. Prominent Scholar. One prominent scholar should sit in as part of the Shariah Committee for the purpose of providing guidance, mentoring, advising and coaching to new Shariah Committee members and Industry Experts. This scholar should come from a list of 10-15 “A-Rated” Shariah scholars who have been in the industry for more than 15 years. Must have some capacity in BNM’s Shariah Advisory Council or is a Consultant with a reputable Shariah research house. Must have international exposure or sitting in an international Shariah board. Is allowed to sit in up to 5 (five) local Islamic Banks, Development Banks or Takaful Companies. Also conversant in Arabic, both written and spoken.This list of “A-Rated” Shariah scholars must be maintained or endorsed by BNM, just like how the Shariah Advisory Council (SAC) of BNM is maintained.
  3. Combination of Shariah Scholars and Industry Experts. Can be appointed based on expertise and academic background with strong background in research. Must be Shariah Qualified and conversant in written and spoken Arabic. For Industry Experts, must be a specialist in the give area and have sufficient experience. This group is to be groomed to be included into the “A-Rated” Shariah Scholars upon completion of tenure. Training and exposure to be given, with the assistance of the Prominent Scholar, on how to upscale and up-skill the knowledge in Islamic Banking.   And to be included into the “A-Rated” Shariah Scholars list, the scholars must undergo an overseas / international attachment with an international Islamic Bank as part of the Shariah Committee, perhaps for a period between 3 months to 6 months. This attachment should ideally be sponsored by BNM as part of the development of the Shariah Scholars exposure and capabilities.

Conclusion : The Shariah Governance Policy Document remains a strong upgrade from the previous SGF and should provide a more serious undertone to the overall workings of a Shariah Committee. This shall lead to stronger governance but I am not convinced on the development of Shariah Committees with the limitations imposed on appointments into Islamic Financial Institutions.

Wallahualam.

Concluding Post : True Islamic Banking is in a Cooperative Bank

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By Dr. Rosana Gulzar Mohd

EXCERPT : If you could reform Islamic Banks, how would it be? We would have to think along the lines of PLS since as described earlier, it is among the main tenets of Islamic Banking. PLS, if well-implemented, can result in higher financial equality and stability, thereby improving the economy. But experience shows that not everyone tells the truth so banks have been swindled. The solution perhaps lies in Germany, where for almost 200 years, cooperative banks have thrived. The way they focus on people as opposed to profits stands in stark contrast to our Islamic banks. This means funding projects that benefit the community and sharing profits with customers since they are also owners of the banks. This ownership structure has also kept non-repayments low.

In the final piece, Dr Rosana proposes that the Islamic Banking model can use to benefit exploring the existing structures of Cooperative Banks, that embodies closely what is envisioned as Islamic Banking can be. There are fine examples of what are available in Germany and Indonesia where structures are receiving good support and responses by the community. Take the opportunity to consider Cooperative Banks as an option that can meet the expectations of Shariah.

For more writings under Dr Rosana, visit the page in this site which houses more of her writings by clicking below:

It is 2019. BBA and Bai Al Inah are Old News.

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WHY ARE YOU STILL ASKING ME ABOUT BBA AND BAI AL INAH?

It remains a mystery when people ask me why Malaysia continues to offer Bai Bithaman Ajil (BBA) and Bai Al Inah products, as according to them, these structures are based on elements of Hilah (trickery). It is a mystery because starting from 2012/2013 period, the instructions on Interconditionality issued by BNM to Islamic Financial Institutions requires that the provisions of “mandatory buy-back” must not appear in financing contracts such as Bai Inah and BBA. Because of this, Malaysian Islamic Banks have slowly weaned itself from such products and have since moved to other Islamic contracts.

Read the circular issued by Bank Negara Malaysia in 2012 on the practice of Bai Inah and their expectations by clicking this link (BNM Circular).

WE ARE STILL READING OLD BOOKS AND ARTICLES

In general, I still find that some learning institutions are incorrectly teaching students that the contracts are still alive and well in the Malaysian market. The text books used are still ones that predates 2011 and really, this is a disservice to students. When they come for interviews with our bank, it does not give the students any advantage or good impression as the syllabus remains outdated. Many do not know about the Policy Documents issued by Bank Negara Malaysia or the contracts covered by the policy documents. This really should be covered in a learning module as the latest requirements are captured in these documents. It is a good reference read, but it seems only practitioners and Shariah scholars are aware of these documents.

This is true as my last few interns also impressed the same. Tawarruq structures sounds alien to some of them, as their teachers prefer to teach BBA and Bai Inah  to unlock its controversies as points for discussion. Let us be clear that most banks NO LONGER offer Bai Inah or BBA, and those which does, offer it as a continuation for a legacy arrangement or due to certain unavailable scenarios, such as fresh new documentations are not obtained for Tawarruq arrangement (such as Wakalah to buy commodities). It is no longer offered as a product to the public and this is evidenced from the Banks website where the structures can no longer be found. And most of the time if used, this is a temporary fix allowed until the deal reaches expiry or the Tawarruq appointments are obtained.

And with Tawarruq arrangements now being ably supported by good infrastructure such as Bursa Suq As Sila trading platform and other commodity brokers worldwide, there is no issue of Darurah (emergency) to justify the continued usage of Bai Al Inah or BBA.

SO, WHERE HAVE WE GONE TO SINCE 2011?

In short, we have moved to the following contracts:

  1. Bai Bithaman Ajil (BBA) – Usually BBA is used for purchasing of properties (Home financing or Commercial properties financing), or sometimes for trade financing products. These usage is now done under the Tawarruq arrangement (using Commodity Murabahah) where the proceeds from the sale of Commodities is used to settle the purchases of houses or commercial properties. Alternatively, Musyarakah Mutanaqisah arrangement (Diminishing Partnership) is also used by many banks where houses or properties are purchased by the Bank and leased out to the customer, who then pays rental and gradually purchases the shares of the house and properties over time. So now, BBA has been replaced with Islamic arrangements of Tawarruq or Musyarakah Mutanaqisah. Other Islamic contracts has also been known to support some elements of BBA, such as Istisna’a (property construction), Murabahah (good sale at profit) or Ijarah / Ijarah Mausufah fi Dhimmah (forward lease).
  2. Bai Al Inah – Usually Bai Inah is deployed for Personal Financing or Working Capital Financing and even Islamic Credit Cards. Again, Tawarruq arrangements has generally replaced these usage with the end result of providing cash. On a smaller note, the contract of Ujrah (Services) is also deployed to support some requirements of personal financing (where purchase of goods and services are required) and Islamic Credit Cards. So now, Bai Al Inah has now been replaced by Tawarruq arrangements or Ujrah contract to meet the cash and working capital requirements.

The final controversial contract that Malaysia currently deploy is the Bay Ad Dayn (Discounted Sale of Debt), which serves a specific purpose in trade financing products. Eventually a common ground must be found to make this contract more globally accepted, or replaced with a better solution.

UPDATE YOUR STUDY NOTES, PLEASE

The main challenge nowadays is to innovate further by improving what we have. Criticisms are good, especially on the old structures. But we practitioners do hope the learning academia afford us a bit more confidence and trust, especially these criticisms and consequent issues are not “unknown” to us, since we lived and breathed in its controversies many years ago. The comments made in recent times are something we had encountered and resolved 10 years ago. We enhance and evolve, and it will be good to see new students coming into the market armed with the latest updates of what is happening and let’s move forward.

It is now 2019. Do not get stuck in the muddy past. These contracts have gone into the history books. We have so much to do in the future arena.

Two Types of Rebate (Ibra’) for Sale-Based Financing

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UNDER ISLAMIC FINANCE, YOU HAVE TO PAY FULL SELLING PRICE NO MATTER WHAT.

One of the misconceptions that plague the Islamic Banking financing in Malaysia is that once the Customer agrees on a price in an Aqad (Offer and Acceptance of Sale & its Terms), there is no backing out of the Selling Price and other considerations. If a house at current Value of RM400,000 (Principal) is purchased from a Bank at a Selling Price of RM1,000,000 to be paid in instalments over 35 years. This means the profit earned by the Bank over 35 years is RM600,000. The misconception is that when the Customer intend to Sell-Off or Pay-Off the financing in let’s say Year 8 of 35, the whole amount of RM1,000,000 must be paid to the Bank due to the concluded Aqad, where RM1,000,000 is contracted. So, if at year 8 the Customer has paid a total instalment of RM110,000,  the remaining RM890,000 is still payable by the Customer. Whereby the Principal Outstanding for the Financing is RM320,000 in this scenario.

For a Conventional Loan, the amount payable is the Principal Outstanding of RM320,000 + any interest outstanding (earned but not yet paid) + any early settlement penalties.

(The above figures are for illustration only. For a more accurate calculation, scroll down to the examples below)

SETTLEMENT OF THE SELLING PRICE.

Because of this misconception, a lot of Customers think that a Shariah-compliant financing is More Expensive than the Conventional Loan. This is just a half-truth. While the Selling Price Outstanding is RM890,000 as contracted in the Aqad, Islamic Banks are required to provide “Rebates” (Ibra’) on the Selling Price Outstanding to be fairer to the customer. Although entitled to earn the full amount of Selling Price from the Aqad, a Rebate on the Selling Price should always be given.

HISTORY OF GIVING REBATES

Traditionally and by nature, Rebates are discretionary on the financier, to be given to the Customer as the Aqad allow for the collection of the full contracted Selling Price. To achieve parity with the Conventional Loans, Islamic Banks have opted to give rebates on the Selling Price, based on their discretionary calculations. This may include early settlement penalties or other charges, which improves the Bank’s profit ratio. This has resulted in inconsistencies to the amount of rebate given; one Bank may charge differently to another.

MAKING REBATES MANDATORY

BNM issued a Guideline for Rebate (Ibra’) for Sale-based Financing in 2011 to address this inconsistent practice by making it MANDATORY (not discretionary) for Islamic Financial Institutions to provide rebates under specific scenarios. Under the guidelines, a specific formula is given for 2 scenarios where rebate may arise:

  1. Rebate arising from differences between the contracted Ceiling Profit Rate (CPR) and the Effective Profit Rate (EPR).
  2. Rebate arising from the waiver of Unearned Profit due to Early Settlement of Financing.

REBATES ON THE CEILING RATE

This is applicable where the structure allows for pricing based on floating-rate, usually prevalent for long term structures such as a 30-year home financing. The structure allows for the customer to be charged based on a floating rate ie prevailing market rate which moves in tandem with the various base rate benchmarks. The benchmark can also be a conventional pricing rate that moves with the market. For example, the prevailing rate consists of a Base Rate of 4.05% + Margin of 1.45%, giving us an effective rate of 5.50% pa.

Therefore:

  • Financing Amount : RM1,000,000
  • Base Rate : 4.05% (moving rate)
  • Profit Margin : +1.45% (fixed or movable based on event)
  • Effective Profit Rate (EPR) : 5.50%.
  • Tenure : 3 years
  • Instalment Amount (EPR) : RM30,195.90 per month

However, for the purpose of Aqad, all the terms must be agreed upon execution and perfection of Aqad. If the Rates are moving, how can all the rates be agreed upon up-front? Thus there is a need to agree on one Rate where Islamic Banks can conclude the Aqad with an agreed-upfront Selling Price. To conclude the Aqad by formalising the Selling Price, the following is required.

  • Financing Amount : RM1,000,000
  • Base Rate : 4.05% (moving rate)
  • Profit Margin : +1.45% (fixed or movable based on event)
  • Effective Profit Rate (EPR) : 5.50%.
  • Tenure : 3 years
  • Instalment Amount (EPR) : RM30,195.90 per month
  • Maximum Ceiling Profit Rate (CPR) : 10.0% (fixed)
  • Installment Amount (CPR) : RM32,267.19 per month (unchangeable if higher than 10.0%)
  • Maximum Selling Price (CPR) : RM1,161,618.74 (unchangeable if higher than 10.0%)

Therefore, for the purpose of Aqad, where every detail needs to be agreed upfront, the following is used:

  • Financing Amount : RM1,000,000 (fixed)
  • Tenure : 3 years (fixed)
  • Maximum Ceiling Profit Rate (CPR) : 10.0% (fixed)
  • Installment Amount (CPR) : RM32,267.19 per month (unchangeable if higher than 10.0%)
  • Maximum Selling Price (CPR) : RM1,161,618.74 (unchangeable if higher than 10.0%)

And for the purpose of day-to-day charge of Instalment and Profits, the following applies:

  • Financing Amount : RM1,000,000
  • Base Rate : 4.05% (moving rate)
  • Profit Margin : +1.45% (fixed or movable based on event)
  • Effective Profit Rate (EPR) : 5.50%. (moving rate)
  • Tenure : 3 years (fixed)
  • Instalment Amount (EPR) : RM30,195.90 per month (changeable based on EPR or events)

This means, the Aqad we have contracted is based on CPR of 10%, but on day-to-day basis, the EPR is 5.50%. Therefore, Rebate on the Ceiling Profit Rate is:

10.00% less 5.50% = 4.50%

In value, the monthly rebate is RM2,071.29 and TOTAL rebate based on Price is RM74,566.27

REBATE ON EARLY SETTLEMENT

The second element of misconception was what mentioned earlier. That to early settle you have to pay ALL the remaining balance of the contracted Selling Price. This proved to be a major contention by customers, although it is NOT TRUE in Malaysia.

Mandatory Rebate must be given in the following early settlement scenario, and a penalty for early settlement cannot be imposed as it will be deemed as trying to earn additional profit on top of whatever profit is rightfully yours. Upon early settlement, the Unearned Income or Profit must be waived from being charged to the customer. A Bank can therefore claim profit that is rightfully theirs ie “earned”.

The scenarios where mandatory Rebate must be given are:

  1. Financing when early settlement has occurred including from prepayments
  2. Financing where there is a restructuring into a new financing contract
  3. Financing settlement in cases of default
  4. Financing settlement where the customer cancels or terminates the financing before maturity date.

Looking at the above example, the illustration is as follows:

  • Principal Amount : RM1,000,000
  • Selling Price : RM1,161,618.74
  • Total Profit : RM600,000
  • Tenure : 3 Years
  • Early Settlement Date : Month 22 of 36 months
  • Total Instalment Paid as at Month 22 : RM664,309.84
  • Outstanding Selling Price on Month 22 : RM497,308.90
  • Outstanding Principal on Month 22 : RM408,559.26
  • Earned Profit Not Paid on Early Settlement Date : RM2,001.79
  • Unearned Profit Outstanding on Early Settlement Date : RM14,183.36 (AS REBATE)

Therefore for Early Settlement, the numbers are:

Early Settlement Amount is RM485,127.69 on Month 22 i.e Outstanding Selling Price (+RM497,308.90) less Unearned Profit Outstanding on Settlement Date (-RM14,183) plus Earned Profit Not Yet Paid on Early Settlement Date (+RM2,001.79). This amount is at par to what a Conventional Loan figure for Early Settlement would be. In fact, in some circumstances, a Conventional Loan figure may include additional Early Settlement Penalties that generally are not allowed under an Islamic Banking financing.

EARLY SETTLEMENT PENALTIES

In essence, Islamic Financing is govern by the understanding that debt must be settled (debt cannot be forgiven) and efforts to repay debts early should not be taken as opportunity to earn additional returns. If actual cost is incurred from the early settlement of the debt, that cost can be recovered but not additional income. Under the Ibra guidelines, it allows the Banks to charge reasonable estimates of “Actual Costs” incurred if early settlement is made within a “lock-in period” based on the following conditions:

  1. Costs that has not been recovered arising from a discount element in a specific period in the financing. For example, the Bank offers a Home Financing rate of 1.88% p.a. for the first 2 years and BR+1% thereafter. The reasonable costs in this case is the differential between BR+1% less 1.88% ie the shortfall from the promotional period against normal board rates.
  2. Cost borne by the Bank during initial stages of the financing for example Legal Fees absorbed by the Bank. If the package offers a Zero-moving cost solution, it means the Bank pays the legal and stamping fees for the customer to move from the other Bank. The cost will be recovered by the Bank.

Consequently, any reasonable costs incurred by the Bank as a direct result of the Early Settlement can be considered to be recovered by the Bank. The Shariah Committee of the Bank can take into consideration to approve the request to charge such fees, based on acceptable justification. This includes any “break funding costs” incurred by the Bank.

CONCLUSION

The common perception is that for Islamic Banking products in Malaysia, the Selling Price (which includes future profits ie Unearned Income) must be paid to early-settle an Islamic Financing is inaccurate. Currently, there are provisions to waive the unearned profits from the final settlement amount as guided by BNM. In essence, the settlement amount should consist of only the Outstanding Principal Amount + any due amount or earned amount still outstanding on the settlement date. This means, the settlement amount for Islamic Financing is NOT more expensive than a conventional loan, and in some cases, is even cheaper than the conventional settlement amount.

The All New Shariah Advisory Council BNM Website

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THE ONE-STOP SHARIAH ADVISORY PAGE OF BANK NEGARA MALAYSIA       

Finally it is here, the website dedicated to the works and reference regarding the Shariah Advisory Council (SAC) of Bank Negara Malaysia. There is a wealth of information on the decisions and fatwa of the SAC, and this will provide valuable reference point on how a particular decision is made. Good insights especially to leaners interested in knowing the methodologies and depth of deliberation that the SAC employs for a decision.

The Centre of Shariah Reference in Islamic Finance

The website itself looks clean and uncluttered and holds various sections of interest. They include:

  • Shariah Standards & Operational Requirements. Currently it covers the 12 Islamic contracts standards that has been issued up to today (21 April 2018). You can view the various standards individually as you scroll down the page. Click on the banner below to go to:

  • Shariah Resolutions 1997 – 2010. This is the English-language compilation of the various resolutions when the industry was in the infancy stages. Lots of very fundamental discussion happenning during this period in the industry. Click on the banner below to go to:

  • Shariah Resolutions 2011 – 2017. This is the continuing compilation cover a more advance level of discussions, as the products in the market become more sophisticated, More importantly, the introduction of Islamic Financial Services Act 2013 (IFSA 2013) provided a more robust consideration of operationalisation of the Islamic contracts. Personally, I learned quite a number of concepts during this segment of time. Unfortunately at the moment, the compilation is in Bahasa Malaysia (Malaysian language). Click on the banner below to go to:

  • Educators’ Manual. This section interestingly mentions the existence of manuals for learning organisations that teaches Islamic Banking and Finance courses. I am sure these are useful documents if it is coming from the SAC. But you need to sign up and agree to adopt the standards for your institution to access these. Therefore I can’t really comment on the contents. Click on the banner below to go to:

  • Latest Shariah Rulings (Individual SAC Meeting Resolutions). This section allows the reader to have access to the decisions made on certain specific issues. It aims to provide the reader the understanding of how a decision is derived, based on relevant Fiqh evidences. Interesting read and quite comprehensive. Click on the banner below to go to:

  • Infographics. I believe this is part of the efforts to educate the public on the understanding on the workings of Shariah contracts as well as the process flows (and Shariah requirements) of a particular Islamic structure. As at current date, there are only 3 Infographics available ie Tawarruq, Istisna’a and Murabahah, but I am sure over time, the number of contracts infographics will grow. Click on the banner below to go to:

  • List of Shariah Committee Members in Islamic Financial Institutions. This is an interesting section because of the willingness to disclose to public the Shariah scholars responsible for the resolutions or opinions at the institutional level. It provides transparency and also reference of the Shariah Committee strength compared between Islamic Financial Institutions. Click on the banner below to go to:

There are many other sections in this website and I personally believe that this site will be one of the most complete point of reference for all the Shariah-related banking decisions. It   may provide a better understanding of how the SAC makes a resolution that impacts the overall industry. I personally encountered a few glitches but I hope the content accumulates further to finally become one of the prominent sites when it comes to Islamic Banking.

Also, hoping someday the website will publish a hardcopy of the resolutions because some of us do read actual books. But if there is a plan for an e-book, do let me park it here on my website. For free.

Overall, I think the SAC website looks awesome and would definitely be one of my reference website for Islamic Banking products, processes and issues.

P/S Somehow I am not able to register as a subscriber yet (April 2018). Maybe still developing this area of the website? Hope it is sorted out soon.

Where Regulations on Islamic Banking Lives

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Many times I have been asked, during talks and sharing sessions, where we can find all the Regulations, Frameworks and product Policy Documents issued by Bank Negara Malaysia. Many are not aware that I do house most of the relevant documents right here in my site. It is hidden (actually, not hidden…) in my REGULATIONS (MALAYSIA) tab.

Most of it are very technical documents and perhaps will make sense more for the practitioners in the industry. But there are many documents that is very useful, even for academicians and students, which is concisely well written and captures the essence of what needs to be conveyed. Especially documents such as the Islamic Banking contracts, which you can find at the PRODUCT STANDARD / POLICY DOCUMENTS (PRODUCTS) section of the same page.

Also there, the latest Shariah Advisory Council (SAC) Resolutions and Updates on various resolutions under under SHARIAH RESOLUTIONS.

Do use it if you are looking for a place for your reference. Also you can click on the above banner to go straight to Bank Negara Malaysia Website to search for items that are not in my page.

Happy Reading and do share the page if you find it useful.

Connecting the Dots : Islamic Fintech

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REVOLUTION OR EVOLUTION?

This posting is in the danger of being written too long, but I think it is necessary to close this year with this topic, simply because it looks at the future. The word “Islamic Fintech” has been buzzing for quite some time now and there have been pockets of excitement on what it should mean. Many financial institutions have jumped onto the bandwagon declaring they are also part of this new wave of what a bank could offer.

While all these are still early stages of development, I do notice a lot of effort is built into “digitalisation” and “apps-based application” and “efficiently and convenience” of EXISTING banking processes and relationships. These enhancements are still driven by financial institutions and centred around improving traditional processes for banking services, or short-circuiting the credit processing elements of financing. Although enhancements via technology is an important aspect, these should not be defined as “fintech”. There is an element of fintech in process improvements, but PROCESS IMPROVEMENT itself are not fintech.

DO PEOPLE NEED BANKS?

Traditionally, banks always hold the impression that “People need Banks, one way or another”. It is this understanding that the bank can continue investing into their brick and mortar business model, with customers always coming to them when they need capital, financing funds or products and services. The competition is that who can deliver existing products in the most efficient manner, with technology as the enabler. Money is spent to improve accessibility to the bank’s EXISTING products, services and proposition.

In improving processes, banks just needs to concentrate on all the products and services offered and build the corresponding infrastructure to ensure efficient delivery with technology. It can be “Apps-driven” based on inquiry or transaction-based, with new features attached to existing products. It is just creation of new delivery channels which will deliver existing products to customers faster than before.

But that in my view is NOT what fintech is all about.

IF FINTECH IS NOT PROCESS IMPROVEMENTS THEN WHAT IS IT?

The easiest google/cut/paste definition of Fintech is that “fintech is a new financial industry that applies technology to improve financial activities“ and “FinTech is the new applications, processes, products, or business models in the financial services industry, composed of one or more complementary financial services and provided as an end-to-end process via the Internet”. The key words I believe are:

  • New Financial Industry
  • New Application
  • New Processes
  • New Products
  • New Business Model

While “Process Enhancement” can help support the “New Processes” element, but I think it falls short of the idea for fintech i.e to re-think the business model of financial services. The idea of fintech should be this: Understanding what the requirements of the Gen Y customers are and how they work, develop the products and services on platforms that they are most familiar with, and the proposition that the bank can offer on their chosen platform. It is a total re-think of delivering products and propositions to the up-coming Gen Y potential customers.

SHARING OF FINANCIAL WALLET

As much as banks and financial institutions like to believe the financial wallet cannot exist outside the regulated financial system, the evidence is slowly being presented as otherwise. Companies are finding ways to survive, live and thrive outside the banking system with facilities and opportunities in the New Economy, slowly eroding the traditional banks’ share of financial wallet.

Big Data companies have proven that their database is far more powerful (and valuable) than the database an individual bank would have on its existing customers. Bitcoin and other cryptocurrencies goes through thousands of transactions within blockchain and is only realised into banks network when actual physical cash is needed. eWallet lets value resides in tech platforms for purchasing and sales of goods and services (more like barter or exchange of goods and services), and up to a certain extent provides microfinancing. Prepaid and loaded value arrangement provides free seed funding and capital for businesses, without the cost of borrowing incurred via banks. Peer to Peer (P2P) arrangement links crowdfund Investors to Entrepreneur without complicated documentation with speed and transparency levels never seen before. Sharing of risks and profits (including potential pay-offs) are now more understood as compared to traditional financing arrangements. Mudharabah, Musyarakah, and Ijarah may now have a place in an economy where equity participation is expected and sought after.

“FINANCIAL SOLUTIONS” ARE JUST A SINGLE ELEMENT IN THE UNIVERSE

Technology can now provide a single-point possibility of all our needs; goods, services, food, shopping, bills payment, money transfers, investments, borrowing, deliveries, medical, transport, social interaction, travel, holidays, education, careers development, information and even branding. Financial services can be integrated into all these elements, now driven via apps. But for this new infrastructure, the various “relationships” are needed to be identified and re-looked and re-engineered. With the proper Shariah compliance consideration.

This “single point” proposition is where tech companies play a crucial part. Rethinking the financial model must happen with the involvement of tech companies due to the advantage of everything being on the internet (internet of things). There are still a lot of limitations to what a bank can do, understandably due to financial regulations. The space of where banks are continuously competing (or evolving) is the “FINANCIAL SOLUTIONS” box above, and maybe payment gateways linked to service providers. But tech-companies? The revolution of technologies move so quickly that regulations will continue to struggle to catch up.

In the diagram above, I attempt to identify some of the areas of traditional banking where fintech can come in and provide a like-for-like solution or even fully replace the proposition by traditional banks. Certainly a lot of the consumer touch-points can be easily replicated in a technology platform, and crowdfunding and crowdsourcing can replace traditional financing and working capital requirements as well. Some services are still embedded into a banking structure (such as Current Accounts or Treasury product propositions) but over time, such products may be linked to fintech and the banks may eventually become ancillary service providers rather than main bank, earning just fees for services provided.

The landscape of what a bank offers will ultimately change in the next few years, when consumers no longer go to banks for financing, services, remittance and settlement of business transactions. As the new generation grows up with tech and becomes financially affluent, their expectation of how a banking experience should be will also dictate the model a bank adopts.

CONNECTING THE DOTS

So where do I see the banking industry in the next 5 years? Personally, I think a “price-comparison platform” will emerge, as seen nowadays in the travel/hotel/tourism industry. Information from all the financial service providers are flowed into a single platform, and consumers are able to immediately compare products, services and prices on a single platform and choose their solutions. Instead of customers subscribing to multiple banks offering different products and services (at different pricing), they only need to subscribe to a single platform where all information on the products are available to select. This is where the promise of fintech can thrive; accuracy of information, convenience of access, and speed of transaction.

It is a matter of time the various industries converge. We may think regulatory pressure will halt some of the progress but mostly it have been reactive regulations. And the challenge is that these developments are driven by tech companies which has no loyalties to banking regulations as their scope of business cuts across various industries. It will be a period of “non-regulated” until the market starts to recognise the need to regulate and managing the risks. A regulatory sandbox will be usefull, but if the “New Economy” moves faster than the speed where regulations are being formalised, there will be a lot of speculative and arbitrage opportunities for the market to gain.

This also means the New Economy brings new risks that the consumers are not aware off. While the banks have been fine-tuning its risks that it takes over the past half-century or so, the fintech companies may not see the elements of risks other than technology risks or systemic risks. Almost all the risks faced by banks are also prevalent in fintech companies or non-banks, plus the specific risks by fintech companies. They might be great at integration of technology, but banks are still masters when it comes to understanding financial risks.

WHAT NEEDS TO BE DONE?

As I mentioned, banks understand risks better than a tech company. A tech company understand speed, efficiency and channels better than any banks can have. At the moment, banks are developing “fintech” on their own which is mostly a process improvement project. Tech companies are developing “banking services” on their own as well, where it linked investor’s money and economic entrepreneurs via technology. The question is really, “why not a bank consume or enter into a partnership with tech companies to provide a solution beyond traditional banking?” We have started to see this trend where banks attempt to purchase outright a tech company and use the company as an incubator for new products and services. It should look into having a different operating structure which encourages new ideas, innovation, internet-based solutions, as well as delivering to a larger segment of consumers (including the Unbanked segment).

The end-result might not look like what we recognise as banks we see today. This could be a separate line of business for banks, where the element of technology integrated into the wider economy is more dominant than its traditional banking products and services. You could have Bank A offering the traditional products and services, and Bank A-Tech offering fintech solutions to a new generation. The same bank catering to 2 business lines, employing different delivery channels.

But breaking away from such traditional infrastructure may take time, and the greatest fear is that the market cannot wait. Fintech companies may be able to offer similar proposition in half the time required, and this will not motivate fintech companies to join-venture with a financial institution. In an environment where new opportunities arise at the blink of an eye and regulations have yet to be formalised, the temptation to go on its own will drive innovation by the fintech companies, leaving behind banks. Fintech companies have the capability to look at consumer needs and develop the solutions from the bottom, and flow the linkages to the top. Connect the dots where the solutions provider are linked together in a platform.

Will fintech companies be the next driver in providing financial solution? I know my answer to that question. It is perhaps just a matter of time where future banking is done outside of a bank. Perhaps the model of banking needs to be re-imagined.

Wishing all my readers a Happy New Year in 2018. I appreciate the support I have received so far. But the new world beckons and hopefully we can do enough to ensure the continuation of the banking industry. I hope Islamic Banking can play a bigger role in taking the industry into this exciting online generation.

5 Reasons Why PLS Financing Does Not Fit Islamic Banks

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Click on picture to go to point-by-point commentary on the above

Many months ago, there was this posting by Dr Daud Bakar, CEO of Amanie Group and Chairman of Shariah Advisory Council (SAC) of Central Bank of Malaysia (BNM) where he stated Profit Loss Sharing (PLS) structures are not suitable for Islamic Banks. It caused quite a stir in the market as there have been a lot of push by Shariah circles on Islamic Banks to develop Islamic Banking products based on PLS.  People were surprised that such comments were made by the Chairman of SAC, when BNM have been active in pushing Islamic Banks to develop these very contracts.

So what is the story then? Do we want to see Equity Products such as Mudarabah or Musyarakah Financing in the market, and is it feasible as a business model under current banking structures?

As much as I want to say we are ready for it, the reality is that there are other considerations where offering these financing products is maybe not the right fit for Islamic Banks. We may attempt to develop them nonetheless, but we have to be wary of the requirements set out in the Policy Documents and comply with it.

As I have written before in Disruption Islamic Contracts the industry is entering the era of Compliance rather than Innovation. If we were to develop for example Ijarah products, we will not be able to comply fully with the contract requirements (such as ownership risks and force majure), and Islamic Banks will opt for “easier to comply” contracts. The risks inherent in the contracts will also hamper full-blown development of such contracts into workable compliant structures. It is unfortunate; the Policy Documents issued by BNM are very extensively written but a challenge for Banks to fully comply with.

And when you expand your intention to go into equity-based financing (PLS), the risks would remain with the Bank as these Islamic structures do not allow for transfer of risks from the Bank to customers. This greatly hampers Banks used to mitigating only certain types of risks, or in the best case scenario, Banks are only willing to introduce basic or safe-feature products, with a lot of legal mitigants to protect Bank’s interest.   It is an uncomfortable territory for Banks where the issue of Banks holding “unconventional” risks cannot be satisfactorily addressed.

In Dr Daud’s assessment, he identified Five (5) reasons why PLS do not fit Islamic Banks, in this current, general model:

  1. Banks are set-up as Financial Intermediaries
  2. Fiduciary Relationship resulting in Conflict of Interest may arise from Bank’s participation
  3. Cost Required to ensure compliance
  4. High Cost of Capital for PLS
  5. Re-think of Accounting Standards for PLS

Click this link to go to the discussion page on this topic. I looked at the points by Dr Daud with comments based of my own personal view. Building a Participation Banking Model : Commenting on Datuk Dr Daud’s points

Go to Datuk Dr Daud Bakar's views

Click here to go to discussion

Why do we need to discuss PLS?

Our discussion are now becoming more relevant moving forward. In my view, traditional Islamic Banks and the way it was set-up, caters more for debt-based structures where risks are traditionally understood. The template used for building Islamic Banks was conventional banking. While we have “Islamised” the operations, systems, processes and products, the similarities between Islamic and conventional banks remains prominent. Leveraging on conventional banking infrastructure was a necessity.

That is essentially what traditional Islamic Banking did. Replication, compliance, and competition.

Needing a new Banking model. An Alternative Banking model.

So if PLS is not the right fit for Islamic Banks, where can it exist then?

I believe this is the right time and opportunity to ask this question of where PLS should thrive. With all this talk about Value Based Intermediation (VBI), Fintech, Investment Accounts, Crowd Funding, Private Equity, Venture Capitalists, Participation Banking and Challenger banks, perhaps the PLS structure should be the next inclusion into these discussion. The sandbox is open, and I sincerely believe this opportunity allows for the serious consideration to include PLS. The risk profile you see in these types of Fintech forums cater for a different thinking; banking the un-bankable, understanding of unconventional risks, investment into entrepreneurial ventures and community involvement in sharing of risks.

And more interestingly, most of the structures are already available in this “alternative banking model” and have significantly similar characteristics and behaviour expected from Islamic Banking practices. Especially on the sharing of risks and returns.

It is something that interest me immensely. I believe the next wave in Islamic Banking must be in this new digital world where speed, access, and business model (without financial intermediation) forces a monumental shift in banking practices. As we are starting from ground zero, why not put PLS / equity-based structures / participative banking / as the focus for all these new developments? If not now, then when?

Leave the debt-based structures with the traditional banks, where the familiarity with credit, collateral, sources of payment and audited financial statements will continue to drive traditional businesses.

Let PLS force a re-think into alternative Islamic banking, where entrepreneurial ability, direct investors, sharing of returns, performance of business, risks understanding, speed, low costs, access to the un-bankable population, big data mining, and technology-driven solutions become the main priorities for development.

There is little choice for us where change is now required. If change is needed, why not put PLS as part of the necessary change? The next wave must start. Watch this space. More on Fintech and alternative models soon.

Is There a Secret Book I Don’t Know About?

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ISLAMIC BANKING PRODUCTS ARE EXPENSIVE?

It is one of the mysteries of the universe that there is this perception that Islamic Banking products are MORE EXPENSIVE than the Riba products counterpart. It never fails to surprise me that in Malaysia, whenever I open the session for Q&A after a talk on Islamic Banking, that the question put to me was “Why is Islamic Banking financing products more expensive than conventional banking products?”.

Honestly, I wondered if this question comes from the possibility of everyone reading from the same exact book published many many years ago, making that one point of contention again and again. Which book have people been reading? Can someone pass me this book? It seems everyone is reading or referencing the same book which says “Islamic Banking products are expensive”. Can someone tell me about it?

So I decided to ask around. I asked the persons asking the question on why does he/she say that? In what scenario? Which product? What feature of the product makes it expensive? In all attempts, they replied “It is the general view that Islamic Banking is more expensive”. But they have yet to give me any evidence when I asked for their source.

Amazing…

This is like a scary bedtime story that parents tell their children if they don’t behave. So now I am asking around for specific scenarios on why they made such comments. From what I gathered, these are some of what I think people are referring to. But I couldn’t be 100% sure, so please, do leave your comments and scenarios (and details) for me to evaluate and respond to.

Because, for the past 20 years (in Malaysia at least), this claim of “Islamic Banking products are more expensive than conventional banking” are simply not true.

YES, THERE ARE DIFFERENCES

Of course, before I delve deeper into this perception, there are differences in Islamic Banking that requires additional items or costs, but mainly these are operational costs or documentary costs or management costs which are linked to mainly Shariah requirement on Aqad. For conventional banking, it is just a loan agreement, For Islamic Banking, a trading transaction may occur, and if it does… there may be additional costs.

But these costs are usually absorbed by the Bank itself, and hardly passed on to the customers. So why would it be more expensive for the customer, if the Bank is absorbing these “costs” as part of their cost of doing Islamic Banking business?

And additionally, the costs borne by the Bank for doing Islamic Banking business are not significantly higher. The Bank have to remain competitive as well, either against conventional banks or other Islamic banks as well. So the costs, if significant, will not be passed to customers to remain competitive. It should be on par with other players in the market.

FINDING THE REASONS

As far as I can tell, some of the perception on Islamic Banking is more expensive than Conventional  products are based on these:

  1. Selling Price – In some Islamic Banking products, there are trading requirements (Murabaha / Tawarruq / Istisna’a / BBA) and one of the tenets of valid sale is that there must be a Selling Price. Selling Price is the sum calculation of all the Installments the customer has to pay over the period of financing. The formula is that Selling Price = Monthly Installment x No of Months of Financing. Once this is agreed, it cannot change; anything above and beyond the agreed Selling Price (maximum) is considered Riba. Conventional Banking products do not have this as they only declare the Installment amount per month based on prevailing rate. Truth is, no one really know how much they eventually pay under conventional banking product, because there is no capping of the amount they may pay. The tenure can be extended, the installment can be increased, the rates may be revised upwards under conventional banking. There is no control of how much (maximum) conventional banking can collect from the customer. If conventional banking products add up the installments over the period of time, they can also see the amount equivalent to a Selling Price ie total amount payable over the tenure. But they don’t, because it ties their hands from collecting more. So, is Islamic products more expensive? It is possibly the opposite i.e. cheaper than conventional due the maximum Selling Price compared to a conventional loan without any maximum amount (sky is the limit).
  2. Ceiling Rate – Islamic Banking products may work on either a fixed rate structure or floating rate structure. If the structure is a fixed rate structure, it looks similar to the above. If is floating rate structure, then there is a need to put up a Ceiling Rate (a maximum rate that Shariah allows us to charge) for the purpose of the Aqad, where the certainty of price is required.  However, once the Aqad has been concluded (Selling Price is contracted), the day-to-day running of the financing is charged at the Effective Profit Rate (usually below the Ceiling Rate) which is reflective of the prevailing market rates. Which is what the conventional banking products are charging. This makes the actual amount paid for Islamic Banking product at par with conventional banking products. The difference between the Ceiling Rate and the Effective Profit Rate is not charged on the customer therefore given as a Rebate on price (Ibra’). For example, if the Ceiling Price for the Aqad is 10% and the Effective Rate for day-to-day is 6.0% (ie customer is charged only 6.0%), then the difference of 4.0% is a pricing rebate to the customer. So, is Islamic products more expensive? No. It is on par after pricing Rebate. In fact, having a Ceiling Rate provides additional “protection” for an Islamic Banking customer i.e. during times of high volatility of Base Rate / Funding Rate, the Ceiling Rate serves as a rate protection for the customer. For example, should the all-in rate of the financing increase to be 13% or 14.0%, the customer’s rate will not exceed the Ceiling Rate of 10%, therefore saving the customer the excessive rate during periods of uncertainty. So, during period of high volatility of rates, the Ceiling Rate will not be exceed thus making the product cheaper than the Conventional product.
  3. More Documents – I acknowledge that some Islamic products do require additional products as a package. But as for main documents, where the most charges are incurred including stamp duties, are usually the same as any conventional banking product. Maybe there are earlier perception that because of the Selling Price based on Ceiling Rate, the stamp duty will be more expensive. It is not true. Stamping will still be made based on the principal amount even for an Islamic facility. Furthermore, secondary documents are usually stamped at nominal amount i.e. $10 per document. The additional documents for Islamic product, if we assume requires 5 additional, will cost the customer $50 extra. That is not significant.  So, is Islamic products more expensive? For documents, maybe. But it is dependant on structure and the additional documents will be stamped nominal value.
  4. Early Settlement Rebate – I probably understand and agree with this point, provided it was made 15 years ago! Traditionally, when a customer takes a loan with a conventional bank and want to do an early settlement after a few months, an early settlement penalty was charged. For an Islamic Banking products, when BBA was offered many years ago, the method was to give a “reduced discretionary rebate” on the unearned profit. This means maybe some Islamic Banks want to earn the same early settlement penalties (like a conventional bank) via a reduced rebate as rebates are by nature, discretionary in the eyes of Shariah. However in 2011, BNM issued a specific guidelines on the treatment of rebate for early settlement of Islamic sale-based financing products. The guidelines ensures that the rebate given is mandatory, with a specific formula to be adhered to. The guidelines also included the required disclosures for transparency purposes. In short, Islamic Banks cannot charge early settlement compensation (only a couple of scenario where it is allowed) and the rebate given must follow a strict formula. So, is Islamic products more expensive? There might be a case for this argument before 2010 (for early settlement cases only) but with the Ibra guidelines issued in 2011, the product would possibly result in at par or cheaper than a conventional bank product.
  5. Commodities Trading Fees – This is a recent phenomena. A lot of structures are riding on the popular Tawarruq structure, and this structure involves the buying and selling of commodities via brokers or established trading platform and there are Trading Fees being charged. Generally, for retail consumers, the trading fees are absorbed by the Banks; you will never notice it. But for Large Corporates dealing in hundreds of million deals, a trading fee may be noticeable. However, these fees are also deemed small enough to be ignored. The standard trading fees at Bursa Malaysia is $15 for every $1,000,000 commodities traded. That’s 0.0015% charge. For a $100 million transaction, the trading fee will only be $1,500. I have not seen any Corporate customers refusing to pay this trading fees. And there are some brokers who are even charging lesser rates. So, is Islamic Banking more expensive? Only for Tawarruq, there is additional costs but for the quantum, I do not believe 0.0015% is considered significant, or expensive.

It really is testament that the men and women in the industry were always looking to enhance, resolve and improve on contentious practices to serve the public. The products were always evolving to be better for the consumers. In fact, I believe we are at the stage that some of the offerings under Islamic Banking is CHEAPER than the conventional banking products due to certain fees and charges and treatment on the account are instructed by Shariah Committee.

IT IS A PERCEPTION THAT NEEDS CORRECTION. IT IS NOT CLEAR WHICH PART OR PRODUCT FEATURE THAT THE PUBLIC PERCEIVES AS MORE EXPENSIVE. IS IT THE RATE, THE PRICE, THE PENALTIES?. IS THERE ANY UNFAIR TERMS LEADING TO THIS PERCEPTION.  

COULD ISLAMIC BANKING FINANCING PRODUCTS ACTUALLY BE CHEAPER THAN CONVENTIONAL LOANS?

In some scenarios, I do believe so.

There are many areas that is governed by Shariah decisions formulated to protect or benefit customers for fairness. Especially in areas of fees and charges and compensation. IF YOU WANT TO KNOW MORE ABOUT ISLAMIC BANKING PRODUCTS BEING CHEAPER THAN A CONVENTIONAL BANKING PRODUCT, CHECK OUT MY COMING POST.

I really hope someday someone will pass me this mystery book to read. We are in 2017 and so much have changed in the past decade. Huge and big regulations have been introduced and most of it with heavy input and consideration from the Shariah Advisory Council (SAC) of BNM. These are learned individuals that I believe are not greatly motivated by money. There are huge responsibilities on their shoulders thus the decisions made will be for the benefit of customers in mind.

Again, I invite readers to provide me with the latest findings where it is believed that Islamic Banking is more expensive than conventional banking products. Let us discuss and evaluate them based on actual facts.

Wallahualam

 

Real Cost of Tawarruq

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Recently, the topic of Tawarruq & Commodity Murabahah has been popular in the industry as both BNM and Shariah scholar have been asking operational questions on the implementation of Tawarruq arrangement in the industry. It seems, even with the Policy Documents, there are still some divergence in terms of operations and understanding of the minimum Shariah requirements for Tawarruq. Each financial institutions have their own operational abilities and processes that differs from one another; to have a standardised platform may be a bigger challenge than imagined.

The rise of Tawarruq in recent years should really not be a surprise to many observers. We are seeing that most financial institutions in Malaysia now consider a Tawarruq structure a “must have”, because there really is no options as other Banks also deals in it. It has become norm, and while scholars might take a view that Tawarruq should be a “last resort” option, there have been so much effort invested into making Tawarruq an efficient machine. Just take a look at the Bursa Suq Al Sila and what it is capable today.

Question : Is it Cash or Committed Limit?

The latest consideration of Tawarruq is on the treatment of Tawarruq funds after the transaction. What is it exactly and how is it been managed within the Bank, with the Capital Adequacy Framework for Islamic Banks (CAFIB) implemented a few years ago (latest update this year 2017). In particular, when a customer is approved a certain limit (let’s say $1,000,000) and a single Tawarruq is done for $1,000,000 for the line (instead of multiple small Tawarruq for each usage of the amount within the $1,000,000 limit), where does the money goes, and what is it exactly in the eyes of Sharia?

To clarify, upon the completion of Tawarruq, real money of $1,000,000 is generated. Cash. It is not a “line” in the conventional terms, but it is money (actual cash) now belonging to the customer. He can draw out the money anytime.

But the practice is that the money is kept in the Bank’s books unless requested by the Customer, and by keeping this the Bank will give a “rebate” on the money kept in the Bank, similar treatment as if a “principal payment” is made (although it is re-drawable). In the meantime, the Bank utilises the money (taken as principal payment made) for its own banking business activities.

The question that I believe we will have to eventually address are on the following:

  1. The Tawarruq is done on a single transaction for the full amount, therefore it is a full release of capital (i.e. fully funded). As such, it should have a “capital charge” consideration if it is not fully utilised by the customer. Bank has released fully the funds to customer (therefore Bank should be entitled to earn a full profit on the amount). The formula for profit would be $1,000,000 x Profit Rate – Cost of Capital. Note the Cost of Capital is on the full amount.
  2. Then, the subsequent mechanism instead is as follows: since the customer did not fully utilise the funds, the customer is given a “rebate”. For example the customer only uses $50,000 of the $1,000,000. The formula for rebate is that ($1,000,000 less $50,000 = $950,000) x Profit Rate x period unutilised. Banks earn full Profit Rate on $50,000 and gives rebate based on $950,000.
  3. Of course, Banks will utilise the $950,000 meanwhile but at what I imagine are for short-term instruments because the $950,000 is customer’s money (i.e. committed amount) and can be requested at anytime. Bank needs the funds to be as liquid as possible. So the Bank do not earn a lot from this “short term investment”.
  4. Also, there is concurrent discussion as to when the amount is kept and used by the Bank, what is the underlying contract used for this “unutilised, principal payment which is drawable on demand” amount? Is it kept by the Bank as Qard (loan), Wadiah (safekeeping), Amanah (trust) or can it be taken as Tawarruq deposit (monetised obligation) or Mudharaba (investments)? Different Banks have differing views on this, but I suspect BNM is trying to standardise this understanding and practice.
  5. But more importantly, while the Bank is giving customers “rebate” on the amount they do not utilise (but committed by the Bank), is there also “rebate” on Cost of Capital then? It seems unfair when it doesn’t. Tawarruq proceeds are deemed fully drawdown (based on full amount) and incurs full Capital Charge but is earning returns based on “only” the utilised amount. The rebate formula is very specific, and it does not contain the amount for “rebate” Capital Charge.

In the conventional Banking world, this is not so much of an issue. Their approach is simple: if the amount is “committed” to the customer, 2 things will happen:

  1. Once the amount is drawdown i.e. utilised by the customer (lets say $50,000 utilised of the $1,000,000), then full price is charged on the $50,000
  2. On the amount unutilised i.e. $950,000 the Bank will charge a “Commitment Fee” of 1.0% per annum (or any negotiated rate) on the unutilised (but committed) portion. While 1.0% per annum do not usually cover the full Capital Charge on the $950,000 it somewhat compensates the charge as the Bank (because $950,000 is still a “limit” and not Cash payout) can still use the unutilised amount in its day to day banking activities i.e. investment in short term financial instruments.

Scholars generally do not agree with the concept of Commitment Fees, and there is specific BNM guidelines prohibiting the charge of Commitment Fees in these specific scenarios.

The Capital Charge factor

I still think there is a disconnect somewhere that while we aim to achieve the same end result by the practice of Ibra’ i.e. “Rebate”, but with Capital Cost coming into play, it may eventually seem that the cost of running an Islamic Banking business can be higher than a conventional Bank. It really depends on how we interpret the guidelines and the treatment on Tawarruq especially the single Tawarruq structure where the full amount is transacted i.e. whether it is a full Capital Charge or otherwise.

I know what BNM usually advise i.e. it is a full Capital Charge. But this concurrently means, without Commitment Fees on the unutilised Customer portion, it may result in extra costs for the Bank. Now I am not suggesting we introduce Commitment Fees for Islamic Banking; this idea of Commitment Fees is a conventional banking concept for recovering opportunity costs, which may not sit well under Shariah consideration.

But in the world we operate today (where each $$$ is risk weighted to a cost), this translates to “Actual Costs” incurred by the Bank, based on the interpretation for the “single full amount Tawarruq transaction”. And Shariah may want to consider this as it is a real “Actual Costs” and not opportunity costs. By letting the money sit still, the Bank incur real, actual costs which is not recoverable as per guidelines. It may have started as “recovering opportunity costs” but if you really think about it, this is above opportunity costs. Maybe in the conventional space, they may even revise Commitment Fees to recover BOTH Opportunity Costs as well as Capital Charge.

So, my question is this: should both the industry and Shariah scholars re-look at the basis of Commitment Fees (in the context of how Tawarruq works), or re-think about the “Rebate” mechanism and perhaps have an adjusted formula to factor in a “Rebate on the Capital Charge”?

Can Shariah consider this mechanism to recover a real cost incurred by an Islamic Bank?

In the meantime, Happy Ramadhan to all, and may you have blessed month ahead.

Islamic Banking Operating Model

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For the past few months, there have been some earnest discussions on whether Islamic Banking is operating under the right model or type of institutions. Comments by prominent scholars on the suitability of certain Islamic contracts in a financial institution sparked debate on the types that are suitable for operating Islamic contracts. Before I attempt to also put my piece in the mix, there were also questions asked to me on which of the existing models can actually be the right fit. There is still confusion on the types of institutions operating in the market.

Before we look deeper, it is worthwhile to recap the available models in Malaysia.

THE ISLAMIC WINDOW OPERATING MODEL

We  have to start somewhere. Islamic Windows as a starting point, provides the best opportunity to build capabilities at the lowest costs while the business is being developed. The intention is to identify the requirements for system and invest minimally to assess feasibility and operational gaps. This allows the Bank to build the infrastructure at an acceptable pace. This is also a pre-cursor to further/larger infrastructure investments if there is a decision to expand the business into a subsidiary.

This model relies on the existing conventional infrastructure where all the processes, operations, sales, channels, finance, branches, compliance, audit and all functions are provided by the conventional bank. It is a leverage model where the Islamic Banking Windows are more like a “manufacturer” of products. Islamic Banking Windows churn out the products and services (like a factory), and delivers them to the conventional team as part of the suite of products offered by the conventional bank. In such structure, Islamic Banking Windows are just a “segment” of products on offer. Just like Corporate Banking products. Commercial Banking products. Wholesale Banking products. Private Banking products. Retail Banking products… and Islamic Banking products.

The advantage of this model is the low set-up cost. The business rides on existing infrastructure and hires specialists in each function. There is no need to set up a different branch as those Islamic products are sold directly by the existing branches and channels sales team. Balance Sheet discloses Islamic Banking Window performance as part of the Notes to the Account. Shareholders’ Capital, however must be separately allocated, accounting ledgers managed separately and the Single Customer Exposure Limit (SCEL) will be 25% of the allocated Capital. A head of Islamic Banking Windows will report directly to the conventional banking CEO, where business decisions are made.

Not many banks operates under the Islamic Banking Windows model. The main reason is the lack of product range i.e. competing with conventional banking products of the same branch, and the small scale of business limited to its SCEL, and no autonomy of business decision which must be aligned with conventional products.

THE ISLAMIC SUBSIDIARY  MODEL

Islamic Subsidiary rides on the strength of the Parent Bank, which is the conventional bank. The model used is still a leveraged model, but the Islamic Subsidiary can choose which services or function they want to “outsource” to the conventional bank (at a fee chargeback, of course). The idea of a Subsidiary is to be independent, so all cost consideration must be taken into account. Decision to open Islamic Banking Branches can also be made, and BNM supports this expansion via Islamic Banking Branches.

However, being a Subsidiary Bank can also be a burden to set-up. A differentiated system or process or operation team requires cash for its set-up. At the early stages, such investment cash will be limited, and when cash is available for investment, the development of the Subsidiary Bank must then align with the conventional bank. So it can be a chicken and egg situation where to expand you need to earn but to earn you need to expand (and spend).

Most of the conventional banks offers Islamic products via Islamic Banking Subsidiary. The main advantage is that decisions are autonomous in a Subsidiary, there is more control of marketing and sales and branches, and the Bank (as an independent entity) can chart its own course. However, there will still be influence from the parent (as the majority shareholder) and the products and services offered are generally aligned to the products and services offered by the parents. The SCEL for Subsidiaries are also dependent on the strategy of the parent Bank, where it can choose to invest heavily or adequately for the operations of its subsidiary.

FULL FLEDGED ISLAMIC BANKS

These are standalone banks that generally are not under any conventional banking influence. The products and services may be consistent with the offerings in the market, but it is not an obligation to follow. In theory, Full Fledged Islamic Banks have the capacity to offer new-to-market products, based on the approvals obtained from Shariah Committees and BNM.

There is room for innovation and experimentation of new structures via Full Fledged Islamic Banks, although they must still governed by the financial ratios and controls for other types of banks and financial institutions, using conventional measuring tape which could lead to a “penalty” cost for doing business.

For example, a debt based home financing based on Tawarruq will incur a capital charge of 50%-100% but in a Musyaraka Financing, that capital charge will cost 100%-400% which will be an “expensive” proposition simply because it is measured against conventional financial ratios.

Personally, I believe Full Fledged Islamic Banks should follow a different set of financial ratios catered to reflect the type of risks an Islamic Bank CAN take, should the Islamic Bank look to offer products such as Mudaraba, Musyaraka, Istisna’ or even Salam. To allow for pure innovation, the financial ratios and treatment of capital and assessment of risks should be differentiated to reflect the nature of the products offered. While Basel requirements can be used as benchmark to ensure stability, an “Islamic” Basel will be even more meaningful where it can fully address all the real risks faced by Islamic Banks deploying Profit Loss Sharing (PLS) and equity-based structures such as Mudaraba and Musyaraka. Slowly, BNM is recognising these differences for measurement and has taken small steps to differentiate, such as the introduction of treatment of Investment Accounts (IA), the Liquidity Coverage Ratio (LCR) treatment, Capital Adequacy Framework for Islamic Banks (CAFIB), and the removal of Reserve Funds (reserves from paying of dividends) from Islamic Banks recently. It is my sincere hope to one day see an “Islamic” section in future Basel releases as well.

The main challenge for a Full Fledge Islamic Bank, is the costs of building the franchise from ground zero. To compete with a conventional bank, the Islamic Bank must invest similarly in its infrastructure and achieve operational efficiency and scale as soonest as possible. The payback period and Return on Investment and Return on Equity remains important for long term sustainability. SCEL is dependant on how big the Bank intends to grow. Another key consideration is the ability for the Islamic Bank to build a strong source of cheap deposits for the funding requirements.

NOTE

Of course there are other structures that can be attributed as Islamic Financial institutions such as cooperatives, development banks, and investment banks. But the most common are the above variations and these structures fit into strategies identified by the bank. In most cases, BNM prefers to see development coming from the Full Fledged Islamic Banks and Subsidiaries. These should be the drivers for the growth of Islamic Banking.

Wallahualam

Is Islamic Finance Suffering from the Wrong Model of Implementation?

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One of the things that attract me to maintain this website on Islamic Banking is the opportunity to interact and share ideas with the various practitioners and academicians in the industry. There are many discussion topics and we intend to bring such discussions to the open table as constructive as possible. Interaction with Ms Rosana is always interesting as she dare explore the Islamic Banking model itself, making comparison to other similar models in the market across geographies. And I do share some of her views on the industry, and I have written about it to some extend in my earlier postings. What is interesting about Ms Rosana is that she is taking the discussion a necessary step further in evaluating the existing Banking model, as to whether it is the right model to begin with. She has written a short discourse on this topic and looking to explore in-depth its implication in the near future.

She welcomes constructive feedback, comment and discussion points for this posting and hopes to decide on the next step forward gauging from your kind response. Do read and give us your opinion and comments. Thank you.

Is Islamic Finance Suffering from the Wrong Model of Implementation?

By Rosana Gulzar Mohd

In this blog’s latest post ‘Disruption: Islamic contracts’, there holds an imminent danger. The Islamic banks in Malaysia are not so much inching towards becoming just like the interest-based conventional banks they were supposed to replace but in fact, running towards them. Even as the industry celebrates its trillion size assets and formerly astronomical growth, there lies a darker truth. In a recent class I taught on the dichotomy between Islamic banking theory and practice, a participant, a new ‘Islamic’ banker, came up to me and wanted to discuss commodity murabaha. She said her team had just tabled the product for the bank’s approval but she did not feel comfortable. The head of the Shariah committee also seemed disappointed. His comment, according to her, was that we no longer need Shariah advisers. The industry only needs commodity murabaha experts now.

Post-IFSA 2013 which fines and jails CEOs and everyone above and below for any wrongdoing and a flurry of policy documents telling banks how to implement Shariah contracts, ‘Islamic’ banks in Malaysia are seeking refuge in tawarruq. Musharakah and mudarabah? All that is left of profit and loss sharing contracts, which some scholars say are at the heart of the ideal Islamic financial system, is the policy documents by Bank Negara Malaysia (BNM). I would be pleasantly surprised if anyone can show me a bank which is genuinely implementing them. The supposed mudarabah-based products brought on by IFSA, namely the investment accounts and the IA platform, are currently being mutilated to look almost like any guaranteed and fixed return deposit. The IAP, I believe, are unlikely to be successful for laughable reasons.

When commercial banking, with its inherent tendencies for excesses, profit maximisation and desensitisation to social welfare, is the problem, how does crowdfunding through commercial banks become the solution? Won’t the banks still look for credit-worthy companies with an almost guaranteed future to fund? Who then takes care of the small and medium-sized entrepreneurs who are also seeking financing? Are not the SMEs the backbones of the economy? Not to mention, where is the upholding of Islamic values such as justice, equitability and social well-being? Granted there are other organisations in Malaysia meant to help the lower incomes and SMEs but why do ‘Islamic’ banks call themselves ‘Islamic’ if they are far from embodying the ideal values in Shariah? Unfortunately, this sad state of affairs extends to other parts of Islamic finance such as takaful (apparently ‘Islamic’ insurance), sukuk, the other beauty pageant contestant in this parade, and other capital market products such as interest rate, oh wait, ‘profit’ rate swaps.

How did BNM envision the success of IFSA with no changes to the current environment? We are still in a dual system where ‘Islamic’ banks are pitted head-to-head against interest-based conventional banks. ‘Islamic’ assets are still only a quarter of the entire system despite the country allowing all sorts of controversial contracts such as bai al dayn, bai al inah and the one that takes the cake, tawarruq. Where are the educational campaigns to explain to customers this shift in the industry that the central bank expects to happen?

When customers, including ‘Muslims’, have been accustomed to deposit guarantees and fixed returns their whole lives, how do banks suddenly sell them an ‘investment account’ that promises neither? Is it any surprise that conventional bankers are using this as a selling point? They are telling customers to avoid ‘Islamic’ products because there are no guarantees. Theirs still do. When the chiefs of ‘Islamic’ banks themselves seem cloudy in their understanding of the new regulations, how did BNM envision people on the street, who are banking with its ‘Islamic’ banks, to embrace the changes? A deputy director unfortunately got defensive when I asked. Other central bankers claimed ignorance because they “are not from that department”.

While BNM seems keen to reform the industry, perhaps the answer it has been looking for is that the Islamic finance industry, and within it, Islamic banking, has been built the wrong way. Trying to make it work in the commercial banking space is what has led to the frequent comment that it is like squeezing a square peg into a round hole. Commercial banking, with its profit maximisation mantra and desensitisation to social welfare, is antithetical to the Shariah ideals of justice, equitability and social well-being as embodied in the maqasid. And isn’t it the one that has been leading the world from one crisis to another? Why then are we so busy emulating them? Isn’t it time the powers that be wake up and face facts?

So why did all the big organisations in Islamic finance, from the global standard-setters such as AAOIFI and IFSB to each country’s central banks and each ‘Islamic’ banks’ Shariah committees condone these practices? Perhaps because they were the easiest thing to do and allows for a fast build if the intention is to grab fame and fortune through one’s achievements in Islamic finance. The countless Islamic finance awards and conferences and the effusive back slapping there are testaments to this. Bankers are such happy people.

So what is the solution? I believe it is cooperative banking. The true, genuine type practiced in Europe and not the ones in Muslim countries because they are largely used to fund political cronies and thus suffer from questionable management and corruption. My next article will thus explain cooperative banking, how the model works and why they are a better fit for Islamic finance than the current commercial banking model. In the meantime, I look forward to your thoughts. Students of Islamic finance intuitively get it when I explain these arguments while some practitioners acquiesce (quietly agree). Another group reminds me of this statement in a book by Upton Sinclair, who ironically was also an investigative journalist (uncovers scandals and corruption) as I was in my former life and whose solution to the 1930s Depression in California is to create cooperative ventures for the unemployed. The idea, to his surprise, received wide support but his bid to run as governor was waylaid, according to him, by the oppositions’ “dirty tricks”. He wrote this statement in his book about the political adventure, “It is difficult to get a man to understand something, when his salary depends on his not understanding it.” The reaction of the other group of bankers brings to mind this quote.

What do you think about her assessment and commentary on the Islamic Banking model? Do give us your feedback in the comment box. Thank you.

Check out her other contributions in the following page : Writings Rozana Gulzar Mohd 

Disruption : Islamic Contracts

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Under IFSA 2013, it is no longer about Product Innovation. It is about Product Compliance.

2 weeks ago I had a session with some bright individuals discussing the Islamic contracts commonly used in Corporate Banking financing structures. We went through almost all the available Islamic financing contracts such as Murabaha, Ijara, Musyaraka and Mudharaba, where I highlighted that all these contracts now have their own Policy Document issued by Bank Negara Malaysia (BNM). The Policy Documents, in my opinion, are a concise version of a lot of Sharia regulations and great reading source. It becomes a reference point where management roles and responsibilities are outlined, operational behaviour laid down, and theoretical basis is justified and explained.

It is a matter of time, I told the participants, that these Policy Documents are taken in their full context and finally developed into a comprehensive structure with clear compliance to Sharia requirements. We, as Islamic Bankers, are in for an exciting period of development where we will have a chance to develop “real” Islamic banking contracts.

The moment I said that, I realised it is NOT TRUE!!!

THE IMPACT OF IFSA 2013

The popular belief is that IFSA 2013 is meant to realign all the Islamic Banking regulations in the Islamic Banking Act, Takaful Act and various major guidelines into a single overarching Act. IFSA 2013  consolidates the various practices into more clarity and re-classification of concepts. However, the perception that Islamic Banking in Malaysia as an innovative development hub would no longer hold true. “Innovation” was the key thinking and pride-point prior to IFSA 2013; now I believe the right word is “Compliance”.

163170_477596024332_7522334_nWhen we first started the Islamic Banking journey in late 1990’s and early 2000s, BNM encouraged a lot of product innovation from Banks as there were no existing guidelines. We looked at the various structures that provides the desired outcomes and discussed with Shariah Committee on the design and component of products without breaching Sharia rules. BNM was supportive on us developing these “innovative” products. Some may have been controversial (such as Bai Inah, Bay Ad Dayn, Wadiah and Bai Bithaman Ajil) but it encourages discussions alongside the mantra that “whatever is not explicitly prohibited, is permissible“. Sometimes we were forced to think outside of the box, especially for sophisticated products mirroring conventional. We also received support from Sharia Committees whom temporarily approved “innovative” products with the understanding that over time, a better solution were developed as replacements.

Now with the issuance of the Policy Documents, such innovation becomes limited. Innovation is now ring-fenced around compliance to Shariah rules (either from regulators or internal Shariah Committee), and the Banks are expected to follow these rules to the letter. Breaches to these rules becomes the responsibility of the Bank’s Shariah Committee and detailed deliberation is greatly expected to provide the solution. Compliance first; if it is not covered in the documents, it probably cannot be done without a lot of effort.

CHOOSING THE SIMPLEST ALTERNATIVE

With compliance now being the vogue vocabulary with BNM, Banks had to look hard to the Policy Documents to ensure the requirements are identified and gaps filled for fear of breaches or fines. The gap analysis falls into the line whether “are we complying to the requirements?” and not “how do we do this without it becoming a gap or compliance issue?”. Both Shariah and Bank’s Product teams would now look on how to comply with Policy Documents instead of using the Policy Documents as a reference to develop a product.

What I noticed since 2014 is the obsession to comply with Islamic contract requirements, and if the team feels it is difficult to comply, the next logical step is to avoid such contract altogether and seek an alternative contract which is easier to comply with. For example, the Murabaha Policy Document issued in 2014. I have to say it is a beautiful document, and outlines the requirements for Murabaha Purchase Orderer (MPO) that reflects the full Sharia requirements of ownership transfers, risk taking, profit and management of actual assets.

These requirements, which in the eyes of many Banks, may be difficult to fully comply with due to many reasons: shortage of expertise, systems infrastructures limitation, people understanding, complicated processes, operational risks, credit issues and fund management requirements. Instead of the risk of breaching the Policy Documents, Banks opt for something less “complicated” which offers “similar” structure. The default solution is Tawarruq Arrangement i.e. Commodity Murabaha.

Or, the teams looks at Ijara Policy Document. It outlines further the roles and responsibilities of lessor and lessee, while the asset remained in the Bank’s ownership throughout the lease tenure. Again, if a roadblock occurs where a Bank cannot fully comply… Tawarruq Arrangement provides a quick solution. With very defined rules outlined in Tawarruq Policy Documents, the Banks are confident that offering Tawarruq will not breach any guidelines.

Tawarruq, therefore becomes the default Islamic contract in the market. When I asked the participants during case-studies to the question “What contracts should be used for this structure?”, the answers are unanimous “Tawarruq”. And they are not wrong.

DISRUPTION IN ISLAMIC CONTRACTS

155228_469014969332_6259944_nMaking Tawarruq as the “all-problems-solved” structure is having an unfortunate result to the industry. While the issuance of the Policy Documents as a reference was to galvanise the development of various Islamic contracts, the Banks have an easy way out in Tawarruq. Now, the rest of the contracts are in danger of being sidelined in favour of continuous development in Tawarruq.

For example, the Home Financing product which had evolved from BBA in the 1980s to Diminishing Musharaka in the 2000s. When BBA was introduced, practitioners and Sharia teams identified several practical issues that over a period of time needed to be resolved such as ownership transfer, rights to sell, and sale of properties under construction. These issues led to the development of Diminishing Musharaka as an alternative solution.

But with Diminishing Musharaka, there are still operational and legal issues that have yet to be resolved until today. For example, the “right” contract to be used for period of construction, the application of Ijara and the extensive outlining of Wakalah roles and responsibilities. Failure to understand the issues and provide real solutions puts the Bank at risk. There are also legal infrastructures that have yet to be addressed such as land joint-ownership by the Bank (as a partner), and different practices of land offices for the registration of Bank as a partner. These are roadblocks (and credit risks) to the Banks to take the structure further.

THE DOUBLE-EDGE SWORD OF TAWARRUQ

25547_378676189332_2665364_nMalaysia is in danger where I foresee that one day the industry itself will became the absolute global expert in Tawarruq and Commodity Murabaha. With Bursa Suq Al Sila as the leading commodity trading platform for the country, backed by the government (as a national bourse), the Tawarruq structure is expected to evolve into an efficient Islamic-structure engine. The processes of Commodity Murabaha will become seamless, and may even integrate into a Bank’s core banking system, the operation for buying and selling commodity will become commonplace and familiar, and this will result in effective processing, awareness of Shariah risks, compliance to trading requirements and well as reduction in overall operational risks.

Banks will one day become so well versed in Tawarruq, they will question the need for other types of Islamic contract, where they may not able to fully comply with.

With such development, more and more:

  1. capital investments will be made into perfecting the Tawarruq infrastructure, and Banks will also be able to comply with BNM requirements by investing in human capital familiar with Tawarruq.
  2. product structures will be developed around Tawarruq and once these products are established, it will be difficult to unwind as a prefered product simply due to the ease of the Tawarruq contract requirements.
  3. variations and hybrid products will be introduced based on Tawarruq, or containing elements of Tawarruq to solve “difficult scenarios” for compliance.

We will one day have an innovative and world class Tawarruq product, but no development in the other major Islamic contracts. Innovation will stall and Banks will choose quick returns and operational ease of Tawarruq. It is a dilemma of the industry where it is heading to “one” major solution for almost all “sale-based products”.

It is unfortunate if Banks chose to abandon the other contract alternatives, where such contracts will never reach its full operational and theoretical potential.

Hoping that a Bank will take the lead to develop products based on all the various Policy Documents instead of relying on only Tawarruq and its variations. The industry needs expansion and enhancement and by focusing on only Tawarruq, the industry will not be able to explore exciting products and expand its horizon. The Policy Documents, as beautifully written as they are, may tragically one day just becomes an academic relic issued by BNM.

Wallahualam.

Earlier writings on Tawarruq and Commodity Murabahah:

  1. Reliance on Commodity Murabahah
  2. Financing : Commodity Murabahah and Tawarruq

Interesting article in LinkedIn

The Difference Between Islamic Banking Financing and Conventional Banking Loans

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I know the title of this post is a mouthful, but I am insisting on the title. Simply because today I came across another round of bashing by individuals on Islamic Banking. Again, the contention is that Islamic Banking is no different from conventional banking; worse still it is claimed that Islamic Banking is more detrimental than conventional banking. How can this be? I watched the video and aghast by the level of ignorance to the nature of Islamic Banking. And gauging from the response by the rest of the audience, it seems that the audience themselves knows no better.

It seems that a lot of individuals are still unconvinced about Islamic Banking. Furthermore, the impression that it is worst-off than conventional banking needs to be addressed. Islamic Banking, while on the surface is still banking, but it is built on a totally different foundation. There are significant difference which is brought about by a single requirement; Shariah-compliance.

THE STRUCTURE 

The basic difference between Islamic Banking and conventional banking is the structure of how the Bank is set up. For a conventional banking, the purpose of set up is to collect deposit and to give loans. This is the shareholders understanding of what it should be. 2 very distinct function ie Collect Deposit and Give Loans, and the arrangement is managed by a Treasury function which tries to balance the returns to shareholders’ funds.

Conventional Banking Structure (Diff)

But what is Islamic Structure then? In essence, how an Islamic Bank is supposed to be set up is based on the theory of “Sources and Application of Funds”. There should be a single flow between the deposits and the financing / investment use of funds; this means there is no distinct function. It is a single function where customer deposits or investment pool is used to fund financing portfolio or deploy into investment instruments, from which returns are derived and recognise. Once the returns are determined, these returns are “shared” between the Bank and the customers (deposit/investment). This “Profit Loss Sharing” structure demands a different way of managing the Bank, although not all Islamic Banks are able to successfully pull this off 100% (especially when the Islamic Banks are still under the parentage of a conventional bank).

Islamic Banking Structure (Diff)

In my personal view, the structure of an Islamic Bank is most suited if it is built around the Mudharabah structure. It fits perfectly on how the Bank is to be managed. It should be the backbone of any Islamic Banks, where the set-up is linked end to end resulting in sharing of actual returns arising from a Shariah-compliant financing/investment activity.

Finally, the processes in an Islamic Bank and conventional Bank are also different, simply due to the structure of which it has been set up. There is a broader requirement for oversight and research required to ensure the Islamic products and services meets Shariah requirements. A lot more layers to comply with, a lot more details needed.

Islamic Banking Diff (Structure)

THE SHARIAH COMMITTEE

Shariah Committee is the most important difference between an Islamic Banking business and conventional Banks. It provides an oversight accountability in ensuring that all the operations of an Islamic Bank is consistent with the rules of Shariah.

Shariah Committee (Diff)

There is a huge layer of governance surrounding an Islamic Banking proposition. Whatever features that it offers, it goes through regulatory oversight by the Shariah Advisory Council of BNM, and stricter scrutiny  by the Shariah Committee whom are not under the jurisdiction of the Bank but reports directly to the Board of Directors. The decisions (or “fatwa”) given by the Shariah Committee will be held solely by the committee themselves, therefore there is a huge responsibility for them. The Shariah Committee must ensure their decisions have taken into account all requirements of justice, customer protection, compliance to Sharia, interpretation to customary civil practices as well as practicality of implementation. In short, decisions must be clear, defensible and without any doubt to its validity.

SUSTAINABLE MAQASID OF SHARIA

In Islamic Banking, matters really are determined by intentions. And the intention is to ensure the Maqasid (Objectives) of Shariah are met.

Maqasid

These Objectives are a key consideration in setting up an Islamic Banking operation. But it does not mean the operation of Islamic Banking and the deployment of its funds are for charitable purposes. It is still a business that needs to be sustained by investing in Sharia-compliant economic activities, therefore it is misleading to assume Islamic Banking is a holistic endeavor that “should not charge interest” or merely to “provide assistance to the ummah”. There are costs for running an Islamic Banking business, and as far as possible it should be at par to the costs of running a conventional banking business. Returns on Shareholder capital is also important to ensure that capital is continued to be invested into Islamic Banking for it to grow. With growth comes the ability to continue supporting the ummah. The key word is sustainable banking. You cannot grow or even survive if you are not competitive.

THE PRODUCT & CONTRACTUAL RELATIONSHIP

Designing and launching an Islamic product is not easy. The amount of work that needs to be done in relation to the fundamental difference between an Islamic Bank and conventional Bank. The fundamental difference is the totally different outlook on what happens after entering a contract. The contract between a customer and a conventional bank is simple; a loan where interest is charged upon over a period of time.

Key Diff - Product (Example)

But look at an Islamic contract. It is much more complex structure, but once determined, it really makes total sense. The contract defines the relationship, the relationship defines the responsibilities and subject matter, the subject matter defines the sequencing and ownership requirements for the use in an economic transaction, the transaction defines the rewards and returns on the completion of the contractual obligation. Cause and effect, risks and compensating return, action and rewards.

What usually confounds practitioners (whom are not well versed in Islamic Banking contracts) are the level of detail. Some may consider the issues discussed in an Islamic Banking forum as “petty” but others expressed amazement in the level on consideration undertaken during discussions. For example, an Islamic Banking forum would discuss the nature of loan (Qard) and responsibilities of Qard, conditions of Qard, transferability of Qard, conclusion of a Qard Aqad (offer and acceptance), dissolution of Qard and implications of Qard when attached to other Islamic contract. This level of discussion is missing from the conventional banking space where in their view is that a loan is an amount given to customer where it is to be repaid back with interest.

OVERALL SUMMARY OF DIFFERENCES

There really are differences between Islamic Banking and conventional banking, and there are some of us trying very hard to make a difference in the compulsion towards Riba’. As a summary, below are some quick differences I have compiled from my earlier days in the industry on the differences between the models.

Difference 1

Difference 2

Difference 3

Difference 4

DNA OF ISLAMIC BANKS

For me, the main difference between Islamic Banking and conventional banking is that the concept of justice to customer is not regulatory driven; it is conceptually driven by the idea of Islamic Banking itself. A lot of conventional banking practices are developed to maximize returns while minimizing risk, and risk-transference is a key consideration for conventional banks. Regulators have to be vigilant in ensuring conventional banking toe the line to protect customer’s interests.

Islamic Banking, in its DNA is intended more than just being profitable. It is meant to be providing service to support the activities of the ummah (Muamalat) defined within Shariah-compliant transactions. There are specific rules that must be followed; breach of these rules means the penalties are non-negotiable i.e. whatever returns gained from these breaches must be given to charity. Care and consideration is a must. Justice and fairplay is always important in a decision by Shariah Committee. Release of customers burden is a priority.

AVOIDING FITNAH

Many customers still lack knowledge of what Islamic Banking is all about. They collate biased and misleading information from truncated and unverified sources on the internet, facebook postings that intends to be malicious rather than presenting the true picture, and comments by individuals who make generalized comments on their experience which may well be isolated cases due to misinformation, misunderstanding or just plain ignorance to the fact. And yet these comments are sensationalized, made viral and deemed to be the absolute truth without further exploration or verification.

Cut and paste seems to be the easy way forward. Yet people forget the discipline that is practiced by the companions of the Prophet; you must verify the information by determining it all the way to the source of the information, up to naming the individuals who made the first comments, and deciding whether the individuals are trustworthy and of good standing. This discipline is lost in this world of over-abundance of unverified information in the social media where direct accountability is undetermined, and it has become increasingly difficult to separate untruth from fact.

I had always advised friends and critics alike to be careful of what they “recommend” when dealing with Islamic Banking due to the huge responsibility of such recommendations. If they are ready to criticise Islamic Banking as “same as conventional” or “open to back-door riba” without full understanding of what it really is, they should be ready to take responsibility for that. If their basis of stating as such is based on “viral whastsapp message” or “comments by third party islamic practitioners” or “explaination by insiders in the industry” or “commentary by blogs”, I do appreciate if we as practitioners can be provided with these “sources” for us to verify its accuracy. Many times I find the comments are based on partial information, taken out of context, outdated writings or information as well as just being malicious without proper basis or discussion. Some are not even Shariah related or relevant to Islamic Banking practices, just operational and processes defects.

Do think of the implications: Should a person make such comments that “Don’t take Islamic Banking products because it is not really Islamic and there is a lot of trickery to it”, and the person listening to that comment thinks “Owh then there is no difference between Islamic product and conventional riba banks’ product” and proceeded to take Riba-based loan products, the implication is that the person who made the comment had directly influenced another person, in my view, in making a wrong and sinful decision. Will that person be responsible for this act of “pushing another Muslim into taking Riba products”? It is a heavy burden to take, not just immediate but in the hereafter. So be careful when a person makes that comment.

And to imagine what will happen when the person who took the Riba product commented to another person (and another) that someone commented that “there is no difference between Islamic Banking and Riba Banking…” . It will become a tree with a massive root, grown by the single seed of the original “defective” comment by the first person.

MashaAllah

Hopefully those doubtful questions on Islamic Banking should be directed to Islamic scholars, Islamic banking practitioners or relevant academicians with stature, knowledge and qualifications before the ummah believes and spread untruth that will, in the end, become a disservice to the religion of Islam by spreading “fitnah”.

ISLAMIC BANKING IS EVOLVING

Evolution

Granted, Islamic Banking is a 30 year old structure, with many building blocks are still in progress. But it has not stopped evolving to existing times as and when new regulations and Shariah decisions comes into discussion. It is not perfect yet, but practitioners are aware of the difficulties of meeting all the requirements without enhancements and considerations to practicality. There is a misguided assumption that academia are aware of all the shortfall of Islamic Banking practices and the industry had turned a blind eye to these. Nothing can be further than the truth. Islamic bankers, Shariah Committees and BNM are well aware of all of the issues raised by academia as well as other practitioners, with the benefit of global awareness as well. In truth, practitioners know more of the issues they faced on a day-to-day basis, as compared to academia where some of the issues had already been resolved by the industry but not made known to academia.

Criticisms are always welcome, but ideally it should be constructive on how to improve. It is a heavy responsibility to ensure the differences between Islamic Banking (based on Shariah) and conventional banking (based on lending) are managed diligently. It is an on-going evolution that I am confident one day will reach its apex. Ideas are welcome and proposed solutions considered in earnest. And as I have always said to my product team; If you’re not part of the solution, then you are part of the problem. So, let’s be the solution that we had always wanted.

Wallahualam

My earlier postings on similar conversation:

  1. Consequence for Choosing Islamic Banking
  2. Shariah Banking in Malaysia
  3. Conversations on Islamic Banking in Malaysia
  4. Choosing the Right Options

maxresdefaultMore videos at Islamic Bankers Resource Centre on YouTube

The Rise of Qardh

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I wrote earlier in July 2014 about re-branding Wadiah following discussions the industry had with BNM. In that meeting, the key take-away was that there is an intention to re-brand Wadiah into Qard, to which the industry reacted negatively as Wadiah has always been used for short-term deposit structures where discretionary hibah “gifts” are given to depositors. BNM contention was that Wadiah do not meet the practice of the Bank where Wadiah was supposed to be taken as “safe-keeping based on trusteeship” (Wadiah Yad Amanah) or “safe-keeping with guarantee” (Wadiah Yad Dhamanah). The main argument was the under the Wadiah structure, the ownership of the fungible asset remains with the customer and the Bank has not obtained sufficient consent from the customer to utilise their funds, specifically for Wadiah Yad Dhamanah.

Wadiah 2014

The solution for the above conundrum, offered by BNM, is therefore, migrate to Qard-based products, where by virtue of it being a loan from the customer to the Bank, the ownership is transferred to the Bank allowing the Bank to utilise it as it pleases, while guaranteeing the loan amount upon demand (you have to repay back the loan).

As mentioned in my earlier writing, some industry players has clear reservation to convert Wadiah to Qard, seeing that the various guidelines are coming thick and fast to comply with requirements under Investment Accounts. Handling another major change in regulations will just hamper the industry’s growth.

Now, 16 January 2015. The revised Concept Paper for Wadiah was issued. We are given 1 month to respond with our feedback.

Wadiah CP

The biggest shock is that the paper has re-defined Wadiah as only Wadiah Yad Amanah i.e. safe-keeping trusteeship. There was NO mention of the contract that most Banks are currently using for Current Account / Savings Account i.e. Wadiah Yad Dhamanah (safe-keeping with guarantee) which allowed the Banks to utilise the funds for Bank’s activities. What this removal of definition means:

  1. The Bank takes Customer Assets and safely keeps as Wadiah in the Bank until a request to withdraw the Asset is made by the customer. The Bank must return the initial Asset to the customer upon request, with no obligation to provide any other benefits.
  2. The Bank does not have the right to utilise this Asset under Wadiah anymore #.
  3. If the Bank intents to utilise the money for purpose of generating returns, then the rules of Qard must apply i.e. for the Bank to obtain the right to utilise the money, the ownership of the money must be transferred to the Bank i.e. the customer no longer has financial and ownership rights when the funds are utilised by the Bank to generate returns. It is a loan by the customer to the Bank. As owner of the money now, the Bank has full rights to the returns. The Bank has no obligations to the customer except of return of the loan on demand. Discretionary hibah “gift” may be given, but questions may soon come on its validity when it is deemed as “Urf” (customary, no longer discretionary).

# Previously under the rules of Wadiah Yad Dhamanah, if the Bank intends to utilise fungible Assets deposited by customers to Banks such as money, sufficient consent must be obtained before the Bank utilise the money for other purpose (including for generating returns). In reality, this consent is really lacking especially for a daily product such as Current Account or Savings Account, resulting in insufficient rights to use customer’s fund to generate returns. The Banks are also not allowed to agree the returns up-front for the use of the money yet circumvents this by publishing historical rates of returns instead. This “historical return” soon was construed as non-discretionary and deemed as returns that is treated as Urf’. Therefore, Wadiah Yad Dhamanah was totally removed by BNM as a viable Islamic Banking concept, and now to be replaced by Qard (where ownership of funds are wholly transferred to the Bank).

Utilisation of Money

In any circumstances, Banks do utilise the Customers’ money for banking activities, including investments. If we retain Wadiah under this new BNM definition, then it will greatly impair Islamic Banks if we are not able to utilise collected funds for generating profit. The Wadiah moving forward will only apply for Safe Deposit Box services where the Bank can charge a minimal fee for safe-keeping services. Trying to apply it to anything else will be a challenge.

Wadiah 2015

The Qard guidelines needs to come sooner than later. At least the Exposure Draft or the Concept Paper needs to be available for discussion and for Banks to assess the Impact going forward. The impact by IFSA 2013 will be fully felt right after the coming months of June 2015, and this new regulation will further add to the re-branding of Islamic Banking currently taking place in Malaysia.

Is Risk Based Pricing Compatible with Islamic Banking?

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As the deadline of 1st January 2015 to comply with the new Reference Rate Framework looms closer, Banks are scrambling to ensure the system is adequately able to cater for the new pricing regime.

To refresh what this initiative is all about, BNM has earlier in March 2014 issued the final paper for the Reference Rate Framework, the purpose being to move Banks to be more transparent in their pricing regime and start thinking about risk-based pricing more seriously. It is also expected to push Banks to be more efficient in their operations; the more efficient the funding infrastructure, collections and recovery teams in the Bank, the lower the expected risks associated to the pricing which means bigger “savings” on the margin for the Bank.

Which was fine when I read it a few months ago. For a quick recap, do read my earlier post:

Please Click Here

But the more we go into this Reference Rate project, the more confused I get. Reading again and again and comparing it with the earlier Guideline issued by BNM on Risk Informed Pricing (issued 13 December 2013), I realised while earlier we understood the concept of “building the element of risk into how we calculate pricing”, this Reference Rate Framework talks about something else. Something I am inclined not to agree to.

Before that, what is Risk-Informed Pricing or Risk-Based Pricing?

I am not sure if there is a difference between the two, but the general understanding of what is Risk-based pricing and the explanations in the BNM paper on Risk Informed Pricing sound similar; both  talk about Expected Loss being the justification of charging a higher financing rate to consumers deemed to be “credit unworthy”. There is an element of discrimination but certain rules have been put in place such as factors that should NOT be used to determine price, such as race, colour, religion, national origin, gender, marital status or age, but that leaves a lot of interpretation by Banks on what can be defined as “risk” factors of a consumer. Wiki even went to comment that the pricing convention hurts the financially disadvantage from access to affordable capital or financing. This leads to predatory lending where Banks may offer exorbitant rates to desperate customers as they have no choice but to enter into an unsustainable financing schemes that they will eventually default.

Does Risk-Based Pricing make sense for Islamic Banking?

In that sense, how do we, Islamic Bankers, deal with Risk-based pricing in the context of the new Reference Rate regime? Is there such as thing as risk-based pricing for Islamic Banking?

Personally, I view Risk-Informed Pricing to be in contradiction to Islamic Banking and what we are supposed to do for consumers. Many efforts have been made to ensure consumers are not unnecessarily burdened but instead to provide assistance. We understand the Bank’s needs to discourage consumer “who couldn’t afford it” to not borrow further and bring themselves into unsustainable debts. But the way of the world, with the Basel II accord being an important international standard,  risk is deemed to have a direct impact on Bank’s capital and therefore must be addressed accordingly via effective risk management where one of the methods for this is to have risk-informed pricing. Therefore, upon assessment of an application from a consumer, a “risk-informed” price will be offered for their consideration; a price where all the elements of risks (including Expected Loss) are built into additional costs and premiums.

Islamic Banking, like it or not, will still fall under such standards, and therefore will already “penalise” a certain unfortunate consumer upfront with a “risk-informed” pricing. Not something consistent with what I feel Islamic Banking should do.

What is it that I am confused about with the Reference Rate Framework?

While we have woken up and accepted that the world now is moving towards “risk-informed pricing”, we try to find ways to soften the burden to  consumers by regulating “late payment charges” and”early settlement charges”. The Late Punitive pricing was also off the radar for both conventional banking and Islamic banking.

But with this new framework, there is not only “Risk-Informed pricing” or “Risk-Based Pricing” but also “Risk-Adjusted Pricing”. Adjusted means Banks can adjust pricing AFTER a future event happening.

This concern basically boils down to this particular clause in the framework paper.

Risk based pricing

Usually, risk-based pricing means initially a price that is adjusted to cater to the risk are given upfront. But with 8.10, what this means is that if the credit risk profile or creditworthiness of the customer changes during the tenure of the financing, the pricing i.e. the Bank’s spread may be revised to compensate for the higher risks. Definition of changes of the “credit risk profile” or “creditworthiness”, based on our clarification with BNM, refers to default situation. Therefore, if a customer’s creditworthiness is compromised and becomes worse-off, then the Bank, in its facing additional risk for continuing to finance the customer, may revise the Bank’s spread to mitigate the higher risks. If you are a good paymaster for 1 year but on the 13th month is out of a job and unable to pay your home instalments, you are now “not-creditworthy” and the Bank has the “right” to mitigate that risk and charge a higher spread i.e. higher returns.

Unless I’m reading this standard wrong, this is a gross expansion to risk based pricing, where the facility rates are adjusted based on the customer’s prevailing risk profile.

RAP

Yes, if the customer’s risk profile shows good credit standing (therefore deemed a “low credit risk”), theoretically the customer may enjoy a low financing rate for their facility due to the low possibility of default to the Bank. This is definitely a benefit to the customer. But on the flipside, if the customer initial credit rating is already “marginal or bad”, they possibly will be offered an “elevated” Bank’s spread to mitigate the potential risks of financing an “unworthy” customer. Therefore the initial pricing will be higher than usual. This is the basis of risk-based pricing, which can be a beneficial tool for the Bank.

To make things worse, should the customer have no choice but to take the financing at a higher rate, they are open to further “elevation” if during the course of the financing, things go sour in their payment. The event of default will trigger the option to “revise” the rate further. This means a “marginal or bad” customer will be holding on two levels of risk-adjusted pricing; the first during the initial approval, and the second on default events during the financing period.

It seems there is now a backdoor to the Late Payment Charges (LPC) that the Islamic Banks have been restricted to. While it is difficult to charge Penalty (Gharamah) due to various restrictions, allowing Banks to directly revise upwards the banking spread actually resolves the issue of cost compensation that Banks were not able to charge before. In fact, if you really think about it, there is really no need for the LPC guidelines anymore; on default, Banks can raise the pricing spreads and it goes directly (and fully) into its income books.

How will this be acceptable to an Islamic Banking structure? Allow me to express my utmost shock to this.

Shocked

Simply put, risk-adjusted pricing and Islamic Banking do not make good companions. I understand the intention is to ensure customers don’t over-finance beyond their means, but to impose this for “default” customers  does not seem right as this looks very similar to a punitive action to consumers. I hope I am wrong about this, but as I know it, my conventional banking counterpart is already building this capability in their system. As this is a BNM standard now, I wonder how soon until we are asked to follow suit to comply with such requirements.

I am recording my official concern to this to my organisation’s Sharia committee. Hopefully it is a misunderstanding on my part. I would welcome this correction in understanding on my behalf.

Concept Paper on Liquidity Coverage Ratio

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Fresh off the press, the Concept Paper on Liquidity Coverage Ratio is issued by BNM today.

Off-hand, there has been a lot of concerns with the issue of treatment of deposits, especially in the light of the treatment of Mudharaba Deposits as Investment Accounts, and the Wadiah with limitations on Hibah and perhaps the reclassification as Qardh. Each Bank had decided on a course of action with regards to how deposits are being treated and managed. There is expected to be shifts in the deposit structure of each Bank and worries that with the new changes, there will be deposit flight from the Islamic banking financing system.

The Liquidity Coverage Ratio (LCR) Concept PaperLiquidity Coverage Ratio talks about the Bank having enough liquidity to withstand liquidity stress scenarios by maintaining sufficient High Quality Liquid Asset (HQLA).

The LCR is part of BNM’s effort to meet Basel III initiative to ensure high quality capital and liquidity strength of Banks. This is part of the framework that includes Net Stable Funding Ratio (NSFR) and Liquidity Risk Management Standards.

 

The areas covered under the CP includes:

  1. Application of the LCR by Banks
  2. Implementation timeline and transition requirements
  3. Definition of eligible stock of HQLA
  4. Treatment of cash-flow items for LCR computation.

Bankers will really need to digest this document to fully appreciate  the intention of the paper. We have until end of November to come back with feedback on the issues on implementation of the LCR.

The effective date of this CP is 1 June 2015.

Ijara (Leasing) Concept Paper

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Reading the Ijarah Concept Paper issued by BNM leaves me with one very strong impression; Is BNM seriously asking Islamic Banks in Malaysia to start offering Operating Lease to the customers?

In general, Malaysian Banks (as well as many Middle-Eastern Banks) employ the Financial Lease structures for the purpose of financing the purchase of Assets, Equipment or Property. Financial Lease usually refers to a financing arrangement where the Assets are “rented” to the Customer (Lessee) and at the end of the rental period, the Asset ownership is transferred to the Lessee via a Gift transaction, or a nominal amount Sale Transaction. This means Financial Lease is very similar to a Hire Purchase i.e. you hire, then at the end of the tenure, a purchase is executed. The risks and ownership expenses are borne by the Lessee and in the Bank’s books (Lessor), the obligation is recorded as a receivable.

Operating Lease vs Financial Lease

But reading the questions posed in the CP, one can’t help but escape the notion that BNM is toying with the idea that eventually, “pure” lease, or Operating Lease will become one of the products that is made available by Islamic Banks. Pure Ijara means that the Bank now takes on the ownership risks associated with the Assets. All ownership-related expenses will now be borne by the Asset owner, namely the Bank. Many Ijara structures nowadays delegates such responsibilities to the Customers by appointing the Customer as an Agent to upkeep the Asset, and it is in the best interest of the Customer to ensure the Asset is in good working condition. Under a pure Ijara structure, ownership will always be with the Bank, and therefore the Bank will incur these cost and shouldering the responsibilities.

So what happens under Operating Lease?

  1. The Bank will always own the Asset. No transfer of ownership will be made.
  2. As owners of the Asset, it is the responsibility of the Bank to incur expenses and upkeep the Asset
  3. The Bank must always monitor the market value of its Assets. We might not have the right expertise for this, and may need to outsource this function.
  4. Even after the completion of the primary lease period i.e. all payments has been made according to schedule, the Bank must continue to manage and monitor the Assets by extending the leasing arrangement into a secondary lease (which earn very little).
  5. To have this monitoring  capabilities, full time employees need to be hired to manage the portfolio.
  6. The inherent risks for Operating Lease must be seriously looked into by the Bank. The risk of loss of Asset, devaluation of Asset value and maintenance of Assets must be internally catered for.
  7. The costs of setting up a unit to manage the Asset may not be cost effective.
  8. The way the risks are mitigated. Credit approvals must take into account the various risks offered by the product  and take into account the risk appetite of the Shareholders. In short, the Shareholders did not provide funds for the purpose of making in a “high” risk use of their funds. Their mandate is simple; safe, reliable investments and use of Asset.
  9. The stamp-duty for an Asset ownership structure is more expensive than the stamp-duty of a financing structure.

Why has no Banks seriously exploring and offering pure Ijara? The answer is simple; The high cost of setting up and maintaining the business, coupled with the operational requirements of offering a pure Ijara product, and the risks that the Islamic Bank faces, makes it a difficult product to offer.

Operating Lease is not an easy proposition as a lot of infrastructure needs to be built. More importantly, an Islamic Bank is not set-up to take on such high risks on their portfolio. In general, the Banks wants stability in its business model and not take unnecessary risks on its books. Personally, I have seen the operation of the Operating Lease in the first Bank I worked in (actually its a finance company), and it took a lot of effort to build the infrastructure to fully support the Leasing (financing) structure. Ijara Financing provides an easier alternatives but that does not mean Islamic Banks should not start exploring Operational Lease. This might one day meet the lofty aspirations of the BNM; to offer products that meets the international understanding of how an Islamic Banking product should work.

At the moment, we are staying off the Operating Lease structures to ensure continued sanity.